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Abstract:  Ukrainian women are on average much more educated than women in developing 
countries and they also tend to show higher participation rates, albeit smaller than men’s. They are 
also at least as educated as Ukrainian men. Women and men with identical characteristics might 
show different patterns of participation to informality. This result reflects in different probabilities 
of women and men to move across states between the two periods under exam. This emerges 
clearly from the analysis of the transition matrices. Both men and women show higher propensity to 
go to the formal sector from the informal one than vice versa. However, contrary to what is 
predicted by segmented labor market theories we find a higher concentration of women in the 
informal sector.  
On average, Ukrainian women do earn less than men and this is true both in the formal and in the 
informal sector. However, when we decompose the gender earnings differential we find evidence of 
two very different patterns between the formal and the informal sectors. In the formal sector, the 
earnings differential is entirely due to the unexplained component, usually indicated as an indicator 
of  wage discrimination. In the informal sector, on the contrary, when the earnings differential is 
significantly different from zero, it is entirely due to differences in the explained component 
(personal, household and job characteristics). 
Overall, these results can be interpreted as the evidence that the Ukrainian labor market is indeed 
segmented and that women suffer some sort of discrimination. This discrimination is not taking 
place through the segregation of women in the informal sector but, more likely, through different 
remuneration of characteristics in the formals sector and different career opportunities and the 
exclusion of women from the better remunerated jobs at the top of the hierarchy. This might also 
explain why women in the upper tier of the wage  distribution experience higher earnings when they 
are self-employed compared than when they are salaried, both in the formal and in the informal 
sector.  
 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Hartmut Lehmann for valuable discussions. Financial support from the European 
Commission within the framework 6 project “Economic and Social Consequences of Industrial Restructuring in Russia 
and Ukraine (ESCIRRU)” is also acknowledged. 1 Introduction 
 
Segmentation of labor markets has been a subject of debate for labor and development economists 
for a long time. In his famous survey Cain(1976), summarizing the challenges raised by the theories 
of Segmented Labor Markets (SLM from here on) to the classical and neoclassical schools of labor 
economics, goes back until the end of the 19
th century quoting John Stuart Mills as one of the first 
economists aknowledging the segmentation of the labor markets together with the existence of 
persistent wage differentials among different groups of workers.  
Since then several of the issues raised by the SLM theorists’ have stayed in the research agenda, as 
those issues remain important despite the historical and economic changes that have taken place all 
over the world. In particular, over the last decade there has been a revival of research on informal 
employment and labor market segmentation in developing countries, generating a lively debate 
about the interpretation of the nature of informal employment. At the same time, the persistence of 
the gender wage gap at the world level
2 has been indicated as one of the most important obstacles to 
the reduction of poverty.  
These two different aspects of SLM theories might look , at a first glance, not so closely related. 
Indeed, the existing literature has studied them mostly independently from each other. However, 
there are reasons to believe that it might not be the case. 
Labor market segmentation can be characterized as a situation in which people working in some 
jobs or in some sectors experience difference in earnings and enjoy different levels of protection 
and sets of opportunities with respect to others with similar productivity. To have labor market 
segmentation, however, we need also this situation to be “rigid”, that is, these differences must 
persist and it must be difficult for the disadvantaged workers to move to the “good” jobs or 
segments of the market.  
                                                 
2 A very recent ILO study finds that “in most economies, women still earn 90 per cent or less of what their male co-
workers earn” ILO (2007) . Segmentation translates then into dramatically different levels of vulnerability which make some 
individuals much more likely to end up in a state of poverty and deprivation than others, especially 
in less developed countries, as labor is the main source of income for most poor people in the 
developing world (Fields (2006) )
3.  
If labor markets are becoming more segmented , such increase in segmentation is then likely to 
affect negatively the most vulnerable groups among workers. Women are one of these groups
4. Past 
research, in fact, tells us that women tend to be more vulnerable than men, showing lower 
participation rates and, even when they do enter the labor market, to earn less and to advance more 
slowly in their career.  
It follows from this that, if we are to fully understand the nature and the reasons of the persistence 
of the gender wage gap we have to take into account also the impact that the existence of different 
sectors in the labor market (formal and informal) has on this measure.   
Research on informal employment in transition countries has been very limited, above all because 
of a lack of appropriate data. On the other side, there have been several works studying the extent of 
of the gender gap in earnings, both at the beginning and in the subsequent phases of transition.  
This paper is probably the first attempt to analyze jointly and thoroughly labor market segmentation 
and the gender wage gap in the context of a country in transition. Using the data of the two 
available waves of the ULMS (2003 and 2004) I am going to identify the patterns characterizing 
male and female employment, both in terms of mobility across labor market states and in terms of 
earnings, in an attempt to establish the extent to which labor market segmentation appears to 
                                                 
3 This is an especially worrying consequence of segmentation, as a recent ILO report (ILO, 2006), the types of jobs that 
have been created worldwide in the last years have been mostly ‘bad’ jobs – insecure, low-paid, precarious – which fail 
to provide workers and their households enough income to escape poverty. 
4 It is not an accident that Standing (1999) referred to the ‘downward’ convergence of male and female employment 
patterns calling this process ‘global feminization’. influence the relative positions of the two genders in terms of wages. There might be reasons to 
believe that it might be insightful to study them jointly. 
This paper begins with a description of the debate about the nature of the informal labor market; of 
how economic theory envisions the relationship between women and the informal sector and what 
are the hypotheses to be test. In section 3 we will introduce the data used. In section 4 we will see 
the determinants of informality and the patterns of mobility in the Ukrainian labor markets. In 
section 5 I will explore the links between earnings, employment status and gender differentials. 
Finally, in section 6, I will conclude.  
2 The debate about the informal labor market under a gender perspective 
2.1 The debate about the nature of the informal labor market 
The discussion of labour market segmentation dates back to the post-World War II period (Roy, 
1951; Lewis, 1954; Doeringer and Piore, 1971). In the last decade, it has been the subject of a 
renewed debate, mainly in the context of developing countries (see Fields, 2005, for a recent 
review) .  
Traditionally, the formal sector has been characterized as the “good” sector, in which jobs give right 
to higher pay, more security, better working conditions and better opportunities for advancement. 
The primary/formal sector coexists, according to the “traditional” school with a secondary/informal 
one providing no benefits, protections or guarantees, little or no chances of promotion, poor 
working conditions and low pay. To have segmentation, limited (and asymmetrical) mobility has to 
exist between the “restricted access” formal sector and the “free entry” informal sector. In this 
traditional view, then, people in the secondary/informal sector find it extremely difficult to move to 
the formal sector. It is this separation that justifies different remuneration of factors in the two 
sectors. For example,  the formal sector has always been associated with higher remuneration of 
human capital characteristics with respect to the informal one where human capital appears to be 
less remunerated.  The evolution of the debate, however, has led to a shift in the focus of the analysis from the 
comparison between formal and informal sector to a more detailed study of the features 
characterizing the informal part of the labor market. It is now recognized by most economists that 
informal jobs are not all identical and that some informal jobs might be actually preferable to some 
formal ones. The main debate now is on the extent to which informality is chosen rather than 
accepted as the only alternative to unemployment and on the freedom to move across the different 
sectors
5. 
According to the first of the two “revisionist” schools of thought that have emerged, (see for 
example Maloney 1999, 2004), the movement across the two segments of the labor market (formal 
and informal) is generally believed to be free. If this is true, most workers are choosing informal 
employment instead of formal employment as they (given their personal characteristics and 
preferences) get higher utility from working in an informal job than in a formal one. According to 
this interpretation, then, taking into account worker characteristics and preferences, labor market 
segmentation would not exist or would be negligible and formal sector jobs would not be “superior” 
to informal ones. 
The other main “revisionist” school argues instead that the freedom of movement between different 
segments of the labor market is still limited and the share of individuals forced to stay in “bad” jobs 
despite their personal characteristics and preferences is not negligible. The distinction between 
formal and informal jobs however does not correspond anymore to the distinction between “good” 
and “bad” jobs, as the informal sector itself is segmented, characterized by the simultaneous 
presence of “upper tier” (restricted access) jobs and “lower tier” (free entry) jobs. Upper tier 
informal jobs in terms of utility are now almost indistinguishable from (and sometimes preferable 
to) formal ones, while lower tier informal jobs constitute the “truly disadvantaged” segment (see, 
e.g., Fields, 1990, 2006).  
                                                 
5 Here I will only sketch the main differences between the differents school of thoughts. For a more detailed exposition, 
see Lehmann and Pignatti (2007). 2.2 Informal labor market and gender  
If labor market are segmented, with limited possibility of movement between the “free entry / low 
quality” jobs and the “restricted / high quality” jobs, men and women might be hit differently if they 
had different propensity to enter one or the other segment of the labor marked. Indeed,  several 
possible explanations have been offered about why women might be more present in the informal 
sector than men. Among these we find supply side explanations and demand side explanations. An 
interesting development of the literature on gender differences in the labor markets distinguishes 
also between the horizontal and the vertical dimension of occupational segregation. 
 
Supply side 
It has been suggested that women may actually prefer working in the informal sector because it 
offers the flexibility they need (in terms of working time, work location, seasonal patterns, etc.) to 
be able to combine paid work and homework and nurturing activities. This argument goes back to 
the theory of compensating differentials. According to this theory, workers are ready to trade-off 
part of their wage for what they consider more desirable working conditions – in the case of 
women, for greater flexibility (Maloney, 2004). If this is the case, Maloney argues, the provision of 
social support to informal workers becomes less compelling than traditionally has been assumed.  
A number of studies has shown that some variables such as marriage, the number of children and 
the presence of other women in the household affect the decision to work outside the household vs. 
at home for women and not for men (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2004; Das, 2003; Gallaway and Bernasek, 
2002 among others). Marriage and the number of children decrease the probability of entering the 
labor force while the presence of other women or the lack of a male in the household increase this 
probability. The presence of children increases the probability of working in the informal sector for 
women but it is either non-significant or has a negative effect for men, while a higher number of 
adults in the household is generally associated with a lower probability of informal employment for 
women (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2004; Das, 2003; Funkhouser, 1996; Gallaway and Bernasek, 2002). 
This evidence suggests that women may be willing to participate in informal employment as a way to better combine participation in the labor market and household responsibilities. However, this 
does not exclude that in an ideal world with a broader range of options (as the possibility to engage 
in flexible forms of formal employment or in the presence of family-friendly policies aiming at 
reconciling paid and unpaid work) they would still prefer to work in the informal sector, especially 
if this was associated with a wage penalty. 
 
Demand side 
There might also be demand-side motivations for a concentration of women in the informal sector. 
Traditional employers’ discrimination theories are the “taste for discrimination”  (Becker, 1957) 
and the “statistical discrimination”  (Phelps, 1972). According to the former, employers prefer men 
to women, either because working with women creates a disutility to male employees, or because 
being served by a woman creates a disutility to customers. Statistical discrimination instead exists 
when employers, in a context where the productivity of each single worker is not known a-priori, 
prefer to hire men because they are on average more productive. Both types of discrimination can 
explain why men may be preferred to women for jobs in the formal sector but none of these 
explanations is compatible with persisting discrimination in the long-run, when competition favours 
employers who do not discriminate (in the case of the taste for discrimination theory) or better 
information allows employers to hire productive women (in the case of the statistical discrimination 
theory). 
Other possible demand-side explanations of discrimination are based on the higher hiring costs of 
women with respect to men. Women could be forced to accept informal jobs because the employers 
in the formal labor market respond with cut in wages and employment discrimination practices to 
their higher costs, such as those related to mandatory leave legislation. Evidence of this type of 
legislation on the demand for women employees has been found in different works (World Bank, 
2001; Paci, 2002). Finally, women can be also forced into the informal sector because of limited 
physical mobility because of social norms (Chen, 2001). 
 Horizontal versus vertical segregation and the “overcrowding”theory 
 
So far we have seen reasons why women might be more likely to end up in the informal sector than 
men. However, this type of segregation (horizontal segregation) is not the only one possible. The 
most recent literature distinguishes between two types of occupational segregation, one being the 
horizontal one we have discussed so far and the other being vertical segregation. Vertical 
segregation refers to the hierarchy or status of women within each occupation or sector, in particular 
to the fact that men are more likely to be in supervision/managerial positions within each 
occupation or sector (Hakim, 1992; Blackburn et al., 2001; Charles and Grusky, 1995).  
It might be then that, not only are women concentrated in the informal sector, but that gender 
segmentation exists also within formal and informal employment.  
This view is compatible with the “overcrowding” theory (Zellner, 1972; Bergmann 1971 and 1974), 
according to which women tend to be more concentrated in relatively few “female” occupations 
mostly in the secondary segment of the market. This would explain the existence of gender wage 
differentials both in the informal and in the formal sector with different degrees of competition men 
and women have to face. 
2.3 Specificities of transition countries 
The theories exposed in the previous sector where essentially thought for developed or 
developing countries. There are, however, several reasons to believe that the results obtained for 
developing countries might not hold necessarily in the case of transition countries. 
First of all, the structure of the economy at the beginning of transition is much different from 
that of developing countries. While in developing countries we have a very underdeveloped 
industrial sector and several possibilities to engage in entrepreneurial activities, in transition 
countries the industrial sector at the beginning of the transition was already developed and 
organized in very large industrial conglomerates, with a very rigid and centrally planned system. 
Even after several years of transition, the industrial base of the economy tends to remain large, 
despite the growing role of the service sector and large firms still employ a large number of people. From the individual point of view, on one side, individuals enjoyed of secure, life-long 
employment, on the other they had (especially in the former Soviet Union) no possibility to engage 
independently in entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, the labor force in socialist countries start with 
much higher levels of human capital, with the large majority of the population having secondary 
education or higher education, a situation very different from the one we find in developing 
countries.. 
Looking more specifically at the situation of women in transition countries we find that females 
labor force were “encouraged” to participate to the labor force offering a “guarantee” of equal pay
6, 
generous maternity benefits and other incentives all aimed at this purpose. Even if this was only 
partially true in practice (there is evidence in the literature on transition countries that women 
tended to be segregated in some sectors of the economy and in certain types of occupation
7), this led 
to participation rates much higher than those in developing, but also developed countries. Even 
nowadays, despite the reduction in female participation rates following the transition, levels of 
participation in ex-socialist countries remain relatively high. Generous maternity leave rules 
(allowing long periods of leave, more flexibility and monetary benefits to women with children) 
and protective legislation in general are still in place in several countries, together with anti-
discriminatory legislation
8.  One might well argue that in the presence of such incentives and of a 
relatively small informal sector women might prefer a formal sector job rather than a job in the 
informal sector and that only those whose opportunities in the formal sector are extremely scarce 
might decide to move to the informal sector.  
                                                 
6 In reality, also under state socialism female-male wage differentials existed. However, women in socialist countries 
were performing certainly better than their counterparts in developing countries. 
7 Brainerd (2000); Newell and Reilly (1996). 
8 Among which we also find Ukraine, where gender discrimination is prohibited by article 24 of the constitution as 
documented in Ganguli and Terrell (2005) How might women in general and the gender wage differential be affected in the short or 
medium term when the control over the central planner breaks apart?  
First of all we can expect a widening of the wage structure (with a change in the remuneration to 
observed and unobserved skills as well as rents), which is going to penalize those who occupy the 
lower part of the distribution
9. However, since skills will be better remunerated than before the 
regime’s switch and since women in general were generally more educated
10, this would tend to 
push the wage differential in the opposite direction. 
A second channel through which the gender wage differential might be influenced is the 
changes in discriminatory behaviour by enterprises. Also in this case, however, it is unclear a priori 
whether discrimination should increase or decrease. On the one hand, employers might be more free 
to discriminate because of the end of state control. On the other hand, however, it might be true the 
opposite if market competition makes it too costly for them to discriminate.  
A final differential effect could come from the existence of gender differences in risk-aversion. 
It is arguable that in a transition setting we might, expect on average a much lower average 
propensity to take up activities with riskier prospects (for example becoming self-employed or 
moving to the informal sector) than we would normally observe in a developing economy. This is 
due to the long-term experience of security and of lifetime employment during the Soviet era. 
Literature analyzing gender differences in risk aversion, women do appear to be more risk averse 
than men (see for example Chauvin and Ash (1994) , Powell, Ansic (1997) or Fehr-Duda, Gennaro, 
Schubert (2006)). If this is true, this should be reflected in patterns of mobility and, potentially, also 
on gender wage differentials as earnings dynamics differ in the two sectors. In this case, in contrast 
to what is predicted by theory in the case of developing countries, women could well prefer the 
security offered by the formal sector to the flexibility offered by the informal one. 
 
                                                 
9 Brainerd (2000) suggests that this tended to be the case in socialist countries prior to the transition. 
10 Brainerd (2000). 2.4 Labor market segmentation on the gender wage gap in Ukraine: scope for analysis 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the Ukrainian labor market from a gender perspective in order to 
understand: 
-  to what extent the evidence is in line with the predictions given by the theory about labor 
market segmentation in developing countries; 
-  how labor market segmentation, if it exists in Ukraine, contributes to the gender wage 
differential. 
This appears to be particularly relevant as, in the years under analysis the growth in the 
Ukrainian employment rate is driven mainly by the growth of the informal sector. 
A first important issue to be tested is the overall existence of labor market segmentation when 
we look at the two genders separately. In other words, do the determinants of informality differ 
between men and women; are the patterns of mobility and of labor force participation similar or 
different between the two groups; can we say, after controlling for observable characteristics, that 
women are more likely to end up in the informal sector than men as it is suggested by the theory on 
informal labor markets in developing countries?  
After analysing these aspects, we will move to the analysis of the wage gap in Ukraine. Is the 
existing gender wage gap in Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2005; Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007) due 
to the higher concentration of women in the informal segment of the labor market, which pays on 
average lower wages? Or are other factors important in the determination of this gap? For example, 
do different labor market segments remunerate observable characteristics of men and women in the 
same way or differently? Is there any evidence of unexplained factors having an important roles in 
determining the gender earnings differential? 
3 Data and data issues  
This work is based on the ULMS, a nationally representative survey,  undertaken for the first 
time in the spring of 2003, when it was comprised of around 4,000 households and approximately 8,500 individuals. The second wave was administered between May and July of 2004, when sample 
sizes fell to 3,397 and 7,200 respectively. The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) 
is a household panel established to monitor Ukraine’s path of transition from Communism to a 
market-oriented economy. The target of the household survey is the working age population, 
spanning years of age 15 to 70. 
The household questionnaire contains items on the demographic structure of the household, its 
income and expenditure patterns together with living conditions.  
The central data used in this paper are those from the individual questionnaire for the two reference 
weeks in 2003 and 2004. We can identify salaried workers and self-employed workers. Informality 
for salaried workers and self-employed in the main job held during the reference week is identified 
by the answer to specific questions
11. With registration, salaried workers acquire several fringe 
benefits, pension rights as well as substantial job security, the latter at least on paper. It should be 
emphasized that in my analysis I am looking at informal employment relationships (job not 
registered in either informal or formal sector firms) rather than to employment in the informal 
sector (individuals working in informal sector firms).  
For consistency with the analysis that is going to follow, I have chosen to identify four major 
labor market states: 
-  Formal employment (including formal salaried and formal self-employed); 
-  Informal employment(including informal salaried and informal self-employed); 
                                                 
11  The questions for the identification of informality are the following. For salaried workers the question is: “Tell me, 
please, are you officially registered at this job, that is, on a work roster, work agreement, or contract”. Salaried workers 
are subsequently asked: “Why aren’t you officially registered at this job”? If the answer is that the employer did not 
want to register him/her, then the worker is classified as involuntarily informally employed. If the answer instead is that 
it was the worker who choose not to register or that he decided together with the employer, he/she is classified as 
voluntarily informally employed. For the self-employed there is a question on whether the activity is registered or not, 
which again allows us to identify informality. Informal activities of the self-employed are, of course, considered 
voluntary.  -  Unemployment; 
-  Out of the labor force. 
 
Salaried employees are asked in the two reference weeks to give their last monthly net salary in 
Hryvnia. The self-employed are asked to give an estimate of net income for the last month 
preceding the reference week
12.  
Like in all CIS countries, salaried workers in Ukraine have been confronted with wage arrears. 
While this phenomenon was less rampant in 2003 and 2004 than in the nineties, even in this period 
a substantial fraction of workers has reported to have received less than the contractual wage in the 
last month preceding the reference week. Some workers, on the other hand received more than the 
contractual wage in this month, since they were paid some of the previously withheld wages. In 
order to take into account the effects of these “disturbances”, I include in the wage regressions a 
dummy variable for those whose last wage exceeds the contractual wage and a dummy variable for 
those whose last wage is less.  
Another issue is represented by the non-normality of log hourly earnings. As in Lehmann and 
Pignatti (2007), Jarque-Bera (1980) tests of normality reject the null hypothesis in both years. This 
results remains true even when we disaggregate earnings by gender. With outliers trimmed the test 
rejects the null hypothesis of normality for 2003 and for 2004 for both genders. Consequently, in 
the wage regressions that I perform I still use the untrimmed log hourly earnings. To check whether 
the problem connected to non-normality is likely to affect significantly the results of the analysis I 
also estimate earnings functions using robust and quantile regressions. The main patterns remain 
broadly the same. However the results seem to indicate that at least in some case there might be 
some interesting difference between what happens in the center and the tails of the distribution. For 
                                                 
12 Since in the ULMS is not available a measure of the capital used by the self-employed, I cannot include returns to 
capital in net monthly income. However, as suggested in Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) this component is not likely to 
be substantial in the Ukrainian context. this reason I will not only discuss the OLS wage equations (with and without correcting for 
selection),  but also the results for the quantile regressions calculated at the tenth percentile, at the 
median and at the ninetieth percentile. The tables for the robust regressions are available in the 
appendix. 
4 Informality and mobility between labor market states: differences across 
genders 
 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
In table 1 we can see a first set of indicators showing how the two genders are distributed across 
the four labor market states, their participation rates and their share of the sample. In the last two 
columns we can see the ratio Formal/Informal for each gender and (for 2004) the percentage change 
in the ratio from the previous year.  
In the Ukrainian working age population, women are more numerous than men. This is 
obviously true both in 2003 and in 2004, with women representing about 58 percent of the sample 
in both periods. When we look at the distribution across labor market states we can immediately see 
that women tend to participate to the labor force significantly less than men (51% against 65 % in 
both periods). In this respect Ukraine tends to show a similar behaviour to other countries, even 
thought the level of participation for both genders remains a bit higher than in most developing 
countries and (not surprisingly) more in line with participation rates of transition countries. On the 
other side, when we compare employment rates, we cannot identify a clear difference between men 
and women, with both groups around 83% in the first period and above 85% in the second period
13. 
In this case the pattern is clearly different from that we find in developing countries, where women 
tend also to have lower employment rates.  
                                                 
13 2003 and 2004 were years of a vigorous growth for Ukraine. This growth started already in 1998 but resulted in a 
reduction in unemployment only in 2004 (see Lehmann, Kupets and Pignatti, 2005). Looking at the ratio of  formal to informal employment by gender, we find a first interesting 
result indicating that the Ukrainian labor market behaves differently from what “standard” theories 
on gender would predict.  
In Ukraine women show a greater Formal/Informal ratio than men in both the years under 
analysis and, even in a period where employment growth was mainly driven by the informal part of 
the economy (Lehmann, Kupets and Pignatti, 2005), they tend to move towards informality at 
roughly the same speed as men (the female F/I ratio drops by about 33% against 34% for men). 
This does not to indicate, at first sight, any preference for informality for women. We will 
investigate this issue further in the section on movements between labor market states. 
When we look at the distribution of characteristics in the sample (table 2) we can notice that the 
age of women in our sample is slightly higher than that of men and their educational attainments 
appear to be almost always better than those of men (the only exception being the share of women 
with university degree or higher in the informal sector in 2003 – 9% against 12% for men)
14. The 
same is true also for tenure (again, women show an higher average tenure than men in all cases 
except in the informal sector in 2003). If we look at how many men and women choose an informal 
employment (both as salaried and as self-employed) it emerges that women do choose to go 
informal less than men in both periods, with a larger preference for self-employment. However, in 
both periods, the share of women choosing voluntarily to be informally employed (over the total of 
the informally employed) is only about 55%, about five percentage points less than men. It is 
important to note, anyway, that the fraction of voluntarily informal is pretty low in both years 
(especially among the salaried).  
If we look at the individuals choosing to be informal salaried and at the self-employed we find 
that the patterns that we identified for the whole sample are the similar only to those for those 
choosing voluntarily to be informal salaried. They are instead somehow different when we look at 
                                                 
14 This is certainly a consequence of the investment in public education that has taken place in this country and of the 
large exit from the workforce of less skilled women as reported by Ganguli and Terrell (2005). the self-employed. While it remains true that women’s mean age and tenure are higher than those of 
men, when we look at education we find a more complex pattern. For example, an higher 
proportion of men tends to have an university degree or higher with respect to women, with the 
exception of formal self employed in 2004 where the share of women with a university degree is 
35% against 30% for men. If we consider the share of individuals with secondary education or 
higher, the pattern we have identified before seems to be respected.  
Women and men appear to behave differently when we compare their work choices with their 
level of education. For both groups it is true that the higher share of most educated individuals 
appears in the formal sector of the economy. However, when we look at the choice of being 
informal salaried versus the choice of being informally self-employed we find that the share of 
women with university degree or higher is much higher among the informal salaried who 
voluntarily chose to become informal than among the informally self-employed, especially in 2004. 
The opposite is true for men and it becomes also more evident when we look at what happens in the 
second period.  
In table 3 I report the mean and median earnings for males an females at the aggregate level as 
well as disaggregated by sector (formal/informal) for 2003 and 2004. Women appear to experience 
negative wage differentials with respect to men in both the formal and the informal sector, with the 
wage gap being larger in the formal sector in 2003 and in the informal sector in 2004. The mean and 
median earning differentials range between 22 and 29 percent in 2003 and between 24 and 36 
percent in 2004. 
If we look at the distribution of men and women across sectors and occupations (tables 4 and 5), 
we find evidence that both groups tend to be more present in the sectors identified by the literature 
analyzing labor markets of transition countries after the fall of the Soviet Union (Fong and Paul, 
1992; Brainerd, 2000). Employed women are concentrated in Services (which include Health and 
Education sectors) both in the informal sectors, while men are more evenly distributed. The second largest sectors in terms of concentration of women are industry in the formal sector and agriculture 
in the informal sector. In particular, in the second period (2004) an unexpected change takes place, 
with the share of women employed in the informal service sector dropping from 55% of total 
employment to 49% and the share of women in informal agriculture rising from 24% to 34%. Men 
behave differently, with the shares in construction and industry increasing while other sectors were 
shrinking. In almost all sectors (with most significant exceptions being the formal agricultural 
sector and the “other services and activities” sector), women experience a negative wage 
differential. 
There are differences in the distribution of men and women between the formal and the informal 
sector. In the formal sector women tend to be more concentrated in the occupations classifiable as 
“highly skilled” (ISCO categories 1 to 3) than men (45% against 28% in the first period and 46% 
against 27% in the second period). However, they are always less concentrated than men to the top 
(managerial positions) and more in the categories of professionals and technicians. The second 
category where women are more concentrated in the formal sector is category 9 “elementary 
occupations”. Men are instead more concentrated in both periods the occupational category 
classified as “craft and related trades workers” (ISCO category 7) and, slightly less than women 
(18% against 20%), in category 9. If we look to the informal sector, women appear to be more 
concentrated in categories 5 and 9 (service workers and shop and market sales and elementary 
occupation). It is worth noting that the share of women in managerial positions in the informal 
sector is larger than men’s. Looking at unconditional wages, however, we can see that despite this 
women in managerial position earn always less than men. Men’s distribution among the different 
occupations inside the informal sector does not differ significantly from that in the formal one. 
From this descriptive analysis already some interesting patterns emerge. Ukrainian women are 
not disproportionately found in the informal sector and that their human capital (as measured by the 
variables we have considered) is not considerably lower than that of men. However, there seem to be clear (different) patterns in the distribution of both groups among different occupations and 
sectors and also evidence of the existence of unconditional wage differences among men and 
women across occupational groups and sectors. 
4.2 Determinants of informality 
We have just seen that women appear to be less informally employed than men. This result, 
however, does not control for the different individual characteristics that might be associated to an 
individual being formally rather than informally employed. In a recent paper, Lehmann and Pignatti 
(2007) have found the gender dummy to be insignificant when used to predict the likelihood to be 
informal. This tells us that, controlling for a number of observable characteristics, there does not 
appear to be on average a gender specific bias towards the informal sector. What this result cannot 
tell us, however, is whether the relation between individual characteristics and men’s and women’s 
probability to end up in the informal sector is the same or is somehow different
15  
In order to shed some light on this issue I adopt the following strategy. First, I run two sets (one 
for each year) of three probit regressions (one including all the employed, one only for the self-
employed and the last only for the employees) having as dependent variable a dummy variable 
having value 1 when the individual is employed informally and 0 when he/she is employed 
formally. Then, in order to be able to test meaningfully if the different coefficients appearing in 
probit regressions for men and women are different, I perform a “seemingly unrelated estimation”, 
combining the parameter estimates and associated (co)variance matrices of each couple of 
regressions (all men/all women, self-employed men/self-employed women, salaried men/salaried 
women) into a single parameter vector and simultaneous (co)variance matrix of the sandwich/robust 
type. Doing this allows me to test for the equality of the estimated coefficient across the two 
                                                 
15 In the text I speak of correlation rather than of causal effects since some of the right-hand-side variables in the 
presented probit regressions are potentially endogenous. genders, allowing for the distributions of the robust standard errors (clustered by household) to be 
different between between men and women. 
Testing the hypothesis of all the coefficients of the regression taken jointly being identical 
between the two genders, I find that this hypothesis can be rejected in two cases out of three (at the 
5% level, the exception being the equations for the salaried) in 2003 and in all cases in 2004 (at the 
5% for the self-employed and to the 10% in the remaining cases - table 6). It seems, thus, that 
differences between men’s and women’s coefficients existed both 2003 and 2004. The probit 
regressions produced to implement this test are in tables 7 to 12. 
I move then to test the same hypothesis (coefficients being identical for males and females) 
considering the coefficients individually. Not surprisingly, I am able to identify for all sets of 
equations, a number of situations in which men’s and women’s coefficients appear to be 
significantly different.  
A first example is age, which in 2003 is negatively correlated (table 8) with the probability of 
self-employed women of being informal, while it is positively correlated with that of self-employed 
men. This is not the only case in which age is found to have different impacts on men and women. 
Also in 2004, both taking self-employed and salaried workers together (table 10) and self-employed 
alone (table 11), men’s and women’s coefficients differ, with age being positively correlated with 
informality for men  and negatively for women. 
The impact of education variables on the probability of being informal does not appear to differ 
very much between the two genders. In 2003, taking all employed together (table 7), we find 
university education to be more strongly (negatively) correlated with the probability of being 
informal for women than for men. However, when we take the self-employed and the salaried 
workers salaried, we cannot reject anymore the hypothesis that the coefficients for men and women 
are the same. In 2003 the coefficients for secondary education do not appear to differ significantly 
between men and women. In 2004, the only educational attainment that appears to have a different impact on the probability of being informal is secondary education among the self-employed (table 
11), having a much stronger negative impact on the probability of being informal for men than for 
women.  
In 2003, being single seems to have had different implications for men and women in Ukraine, 
taking all the employed together (table 7) but especially among the self-employed (table 8). While 
for self-employed women it is associated with a reduction in the probability to be informal, in the 
case of self-employed men the relation is positive. While we do not find other regressions where the 
fact of being single has a negative relation with women’s probability of being informally employed, 
in several cases it remains positively associated with men’s probability of being informal (maybe 
due to a lower risk-aversion characterizing single man) while for women it is always insignificant.  
Having at least a child less than six year old is significantly positively correlated the probability 
of self-employed men to be informal, both in tables 8 and 11. In one case (2003) our test rejects the 
hypothesis that the coefficients for men and women are identical. This happens also in 2004 in the 
regressions for the salaried workers. This time the probability of being informal is negatively 
correlated with having a child aged less than six, while for women the relation is positive but 
insignificant. It is surprising that the having at least a child aged less than six do not seem to affect 
significantly women’s probability to be informal in any of the regressions, as theory would predict 
women behaviour to be more influenced by the presence of young children in the household than 
men. 
In 2003, a higher number of members of the household working in the formal sector is 
negatively associated with the probability of working informally among the salaried, both for men 
and women. This might indicate the existence of some form of comparative advantage for those 
having other household members in the formal sector, when they look for a formal job. Among the 
self-employed, however men and women behave differently (table 8). Our test confirms that 
coefficients for men and women for the self-employed are indeed different (for women we have a negative correlation with informality while for men the relation turns out to be insignificant). This 
pattern is confirmed also in 2004. In the other cases no significant difference arises between 
genders. However, it is worth noting that all coefficients that before were significant and negative 
now become insignificant.  
Working part-time is always associated with an higher probability of being informal. However, 
while in 2003 men and women coefficients were similar (the hypothesis of identical coefficients is 
never rejected), in 2004 this relation appears to become much stronger for men than for women 
(tables 10 and 12) and the test always reject the hypothesis of identical coefficients. 
Of the variables that were included in the probit regressions because thought to be related with 
the probability of being formal, tenure is the only one for which we have never found evidence of 
significant differences between men and women. The link between tenure and informality appears 
always to be negative for salaried workers and negative or insignificant for the self-employed,  a 
result we could expect knowing that informality is a relatively new phenomenon in Ukraine.   
These results confirm that, overall, the hypothesis that men and women are linked to the 
informal sector in the same way has to be rejected. This becomes even more evident in 2004, where 
the informal sector is gaining space and the economy is starting to change faster. Causes for these 
differences might be several. Among those, the presence of different risk-aversion between the two 
gender groups or the existence of different sets of opportunities available to them. In the next 
section we will see if and how this reflects in the patterns of mobility of the two genders across 
different labor market states.  
4.3. Gender differences in mobility across the different labor market states. 
Looking at patterns of mobility across labor market states is particularly important in an analysis 
of labor market segmentation, as one of the characteristics of a SLM is limited mobility, especially 
from the secondary sector of the economy to the primary one.  Exploiting the panel structure of the ULMS we are going to look at these patterns using the 
same set of matrices used by Maloney (1999) and  Lehmann and Pignatti (2007), with reference to 
the Mexican and Ukrainian labor markets. In this case, however I will split the sample in two, to 
test whether there are diverging patterns between males and females.  
As in standard transition matrices we have unconditional mean transition probabilities, to take 
into account compositional effects, I also produce mean transition probabilities conditioned on a set 
of observable characteristics. After calculating these “predicted” transition probabilities for men and 
women, I will produce counterfactual tables reporting predicted probabilities obtained applying 
“female coefficients” to men’s characteristics and “male coefficients” to women’s characteristics.  
Theory of SLM would seem to suggest that the segmentation effect – if it exists – should be 
stronger for women than for men, also due to self selection, to the potential existence of 
discriminating behaviour from employers and to other factors. We would also expect very limited 
mobility between the two sectors, especially for women.  
In the upper panel of table 13 I report the raw transition probabilities across four states (formal 
employment, informal employment, unemployment, out of the labor force) for females and males in 
the period 2003-2004. These probabilities assume that movements between states are governed by a 
Markov process
16 and are calculated as the ratio of the outflows from the origin state in 2003 to the 
destination state in 2004 over the total stock in the origin state in 2003
17.  
From the observation of raw transition probabilities we see, contrary to our expectations, that 
women in Ukraine tend to have higher probability to remain in the formal sector and less in the 
                                                 
16 As argued in Bellmann et al.(1995), the assumption that movements between states are governed by a Markov 
process seems appropriate for an economy subject to sudden structural shocks, where individual work histories become 
of lesser importance. This is indeed the case for Ukraine, which, despite having started the transition process almost a 
decade ago is still in an early phase of transition in the period under exam. 
17 One potential problem with these estimated probabilities might raise if “round tripping” problems were relevant. 
However, as discussed in Lehmann and Pignatti (2007)  in this dataset round tripping is minimal. informal sector. This reflects a lower share of women moving from formal to informal jobs, even 
more so if we consider that a higher percentage of women leaving formal employment move out of 
the labor force compared to men. A lower share of women leaving informal employment moves to 
formal employment relative to men. Women instead move more than men towards unemployment 
and out the labor force, indicating perhaps higher barriers to entry into the formal segment for 
women coming from informality. Looking at transitions from unemployment, we can identify 
another diverging pattern between men and women. Most men (about two thirds) flowing out of 
unemployment tend to enter either the formal or the informal sector. Women flowing out of 
unemployment instead tend to go back to work only in about half of the cases while the remaining 
half moves out of the labor force. Indeed, this is just another confirmation of the worldwide 
tendency of women’s participation rates to be lower than those of men. What is striking however is 
that most of the difference between men and women appears to be due to a much lower fraction of 
women going back to work in the informal sector (9.4%) with respect to men (17.4%) while the 
fractions of the two groups of unemployed flowing back to work in the formal sector is very similar 
(25.3% for men against 24.8% for women). 
The raw probabilities we have just seen, however, do not take into account the fact that 
departure and destination states may differ very much in terms of relative size and that labor market 
states’ shares might grow and shrink at different paces in the period under exam (within the same 
group and/or between the two groups). In our case, for example, the size of the formal sector 
remains much larger in both periods for both males and females, but the relative importance of 
these sectors is different for the two groups, with formal employment being the state where more 
men can be found in both periods while out of the labor force is the state with the number of  
women in both periods. Informal employment’s share is growing faster for men than for women. To 
take into account of these effects in my analysis, I standardize the raw probabilities by the share of 
the destination state at the end of the period (P.j) obtaining the Q matrices (Maloney, 1999).  Even adjusting for the size of the terminal state, men show a higher probability to move from 
formal to informal employment, but also a higher probability to move from informality to formality. 
Women show instead a much higher probability to move to unemployment from informality rather 
than to go formal.  
If we want to compare the results obtained and attempt to identify the “disposition” of 
individuals to move across sectors, however, we need to take into account how likely is an 
individual to leave the state he comes from and how difficult it can be finding an “opening” in a 
different state. This is the intuition behind the V matrix that we find at the bottom panel of the table. 
In practice, I multiply the values of the Q matrix by the reciprocal of the outflow rate from the 
origin and destination states
18. 
Both Ukrainian men and women show a higher disposition to move from the informal sector to 
the formal sector than vice versa. However, this effect appears to be stronger for women than for 
men. If we look at the unemployed, again men seem more likely to move to informality than 
formality, while for women the result is the opposite. Only when we look at individuals flowing 
back from out of the labor force, we see a common pattern (much stronger for females than for 
males, this time), that is, a higher propensity to enter in the informal sector rather than in the formal 
one. This result might indicate that individuals (especially women) with lower attachment to the 
labor force, when they decide to go back to work might prefer informal employment to formal 
employment (arguably for the same reasons that cause their low attachment). 
The results we have discussed so far, however, are based on unconditional mean transition 
probabilities between the various states that do not take into account compositional effects. For this 
reason, I decided to predict individual transition probabilities for males and females after estimating 
two sets of multinomial logit regressions (one for each gender) to control for a set of observable 
                                                 
18 Under Markovian assumptions, this corresponds to the duration of state occupancy (exponentially distributed). For a 
more detailed description of Q and V matrices, please see Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) or Maloney (1999). characteristics. I always choose the origin state as the default category. The interesting advantage of 
the multinomial logit model is that, once I have the estimated parameters, I can predict the 
probability that a new individual with a specified set of characteristics will be in one of the j 
categories available. I use this property also in my prediction of the counterfactual transition 
probabilities
19. 
In table 14 we find the new P, Q and V matrices based on predicted probabilities. The first thing 
we observe is that the predicted probability of remaining in the origin state is higher for both 
groups. However, when we look at the differences across genders we see that now the pattern is 
exactly the opposite than it was before. Once we control for observable characteristics, men’s 
probability to stay in the formal sector is higher than women’s, while the opposite becomes true for 
informal employment. Women appear to be more represented in the formal sector (and less in the 
informal sector) mainly because of the different characteristics they have. This, however, has the 
effect to strengthen the results we found before. Now women show an even higher disposition to 
move from the informal sector  to the formal sector compared to the disposition towards the 
opposite movement (matrix V). This time, this becomes more evident also for men. We confirm that 
individuals in Ukraine seem to prefer moving from informal to formal than vice-versa (the only 
exception being the high propensity of women out of the labor force to move to informality). 
To conclude the analysis of mobility across labor market states, in the effort to disentangle the 
effects due to the different distribution of characteristics across genders from those due to different 
coefficients I calculated two counterfactuals. First, I calculated the predicted transition probabilities 
for men applying women’s coefficients to their characteristics. Then, I applied men’s coefficients to 
women’s characteristics. The results are in table 15.  
Counterfactual transition probabilities confirm that, keeping characteristics constant, men would 
be more likely to stay in formal employment  and less in the informal one if they “behaved” as 
                                                 
19 The results of the multinomial logit regressions are in the appendix. women (had women’s coefficients). They would also be more “keen” to move from the informal 
sector to the formal one and less to move in the opposite direction. On the other side, women, 
keeping characteristics constant and applying men’s coefficients show the opposite tendency,  i.e. 
an increased disposition to move from formal to informal and smaller disposition to move in the 
opposite direction. We can conclude that women in Ukraine seem not only to have characteristics 
making them more likely to stay in formal employment than men, but also a strong “preference” for 
that form of employment, both in absolute terms and relative to men.  
5 Wages, employment status and gender differentials 
After analysing labor market mobility, we also also at the way in which labor is remunerated in 
the formal and informal sectors and if the same mechanisms seem to hold for both men and women. 
Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) find evidence supporting the second “revisionist” school of labor 
market segmentation. First of all, they find that the formal sector remunerates education and tenure 
while the informal sector does not. They also find some evidence of the fact that wages tend to 
grow less for individuals moving from the formal to the informal sector, compared to those staying 
in the formal sector, with the notable exception of those who choose voluntarily an informal job.  
Finally, they find that female workers in the formal sector are disadvantaged in both years with 
respect to men. This is also true for the informal sector, but only for the first period.  
Their results, however do not tell us anything about the determinants of this differential. In their 
model, in fact, coefficients for men and women are forced to be the same. It might be that 
coefficients for men and women are indeed the same, or that, instead, similar characteristics are 
remunerated differently according to the gender of the worker (this could be true, for example, if 
one of the two groups was discriminated against).  
In this section I intend to test two hypotheses: whether this wage differential is due to a different 
remuneration of similar characteristics (coefficients) or to a difference in endowments 
(characteristics). I will also try to identify the determinants of the log earnings in the two periods and in the two sectors of the labor market for men and for men and women, looking for additional 
evidence for or against labor market segmentation. To test for the relevance on non-normality on 
the results, also estimate robust regressions and median regressions. However, as the main patterns 
identified do not seem to differ from those identified with OLS regressions, I will mainly base my 
analysis on OLS results.  
To decompose the wage differential, I will perform a twofold Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 
1973) of the difference in mean predicted wages, choosing males as the “non-discriminated group”. 
This is, in fact, the usual assumption in literature studying the gender wage differential. This 
procedure decomposes the difference in the mean predicted wages in an explained component (due 
in our case to differences in endowments between men and women) and an unexplained one (due to 
differences in coefficients and to the interaction of coefficients and endowments). Using the results 
obtained by separate wage regressions for men and women in both sectors and in both years, I 
perform the Oaxaca decomposition of the gender earnings differential. In order to take into account 
for the possible presence of selection I perform also the Oaxaca decomposition correcting for 
selection as suggested in the literature (see for example Neuman and Oaxaca, 2004 ). The results of 
the OLS regressions (with and without correcting for selection) are reported in tables 16 to 19.  
The simple OLS regressions I perform show the existence of some common trends, but also 
some differences across genders. Both in 2003 and 2004, for example, the formal sector 
remunerates more individuals (men and women) with higher human capital, while in the informal 
sector this does not seem to happen. In one case, (table19), to higher age (my proxy for experience) 
was associated a wage penalty. Another interesting result is represented by the dummy for the self 
employed in the informal sector that becomes significant and positive for both men and women in 
2004. For women, also having chosen to work informally in 2004 leads to an increase in expected 
wage. Unfortunately, however, when we look at median and robust regressions (tables 20 to 27), the 
effect for women becomes insignificant. I suspect that this, coherently with the most recent versions of the theory on market segmentation, might hide radically different behaviours in the top of the 
distribution with respect to the bottom. For this reason, in addition to robust and median 
regressions, I perform two sets of quantile regression. calculated at the 10
th percentile, and at the 
90
th percentile. The results of these regressions, at least for 2004, indeed show different patterns not 
only between genders but also within the genders themselves
20.  
The first difference is related to the significance of the variables choice to be informal and self-
employed. In the regression for males the coefficient remains significant at the median but it is not 
significant anymore in the tails of the distribution (10
th and 90
th percentile). The opposite is true for 
women. The effect of these variables at the 10
th percentile and at the median is insignificant. 
However, when we look at the upper tier of women working in the informal sector we find that both 
the choice of being informal salaried and that of being self-employed increases significantly the 
expected wage. This is a very interesting result, in line with what segmentation theories suggest: 
informal sector segmented in itself, with an upper and a lower tier. Women choosing to be informal 
in the upper tier of the wage distribution appear to reap the (monetary) benefits of being informal, 
while those of the lower tiers do not. It is interesting to note that also in the formal sector the 
variable relative to self-employment is significantly positive only for the upper tier women 
distribution, while it is not so for men. 
Going back to OLS, gender differences emerge also in other cases. For example, women 
working part-time experience in most cases (except in the formal sector in 2004), ceteris paribus, 
higher hourly salaries than women working full time, while this is not true for men
21. Again, 
women seem to gain more from having university degree or higher. Looking at quantile regressions 
                                                 
20 This does not happen for 2003. For completeness, even thought they will not be discussed here, I add also the 
tables for median and robust regressions relative to 2003. 
21 This is confirmed by robust regressions, but it does not appear to be significant in quantile regressions. we see that these gains are larger for those at the top of the distribution and lower for those at the 
bottom
22.  
To control for selection, I also run a second set of OLS regressions, where the selection equation 
was estimated with a multinomial logit model, following the methodology suggested by Lee (1983). 
The results in columns 3 and 4  of tables 16 to 19, however, do not differ significantly from those of 
the OLS regressions without selection. Only in one case, does the selection term become 
significant, in the case of men working in the formal sector in 2004.  
After estimating wage equations, I can implement the Oaxaca decomposition of the earning 
differential between men and women. As we are trying to test if earnings dynamics differ, not only 
between genders in general, but also within the different sectors, I apply the Oaxaca decomposition 
separately to the two sectors. The results of the Oaxaca decomposition (adjusted and not adjusted 
for selection) are in table 28
23. 
We immediately notice some differences between the results for the formal and those for the 
informal sector. Looking at the decomposition not adjusted for selection we see that in both sectors 
the difference in the mean predicted earnings is fairly similar (slightly higher in the formal sector in 
2003 and in the informal sector in 2004). However, when we look at the decomposition of the 
differential, a big difference emerges. While in the informal sector the positive differential of men is 
almost entirely due to differences in characteristics (personal characteristics, job characteristics or 
sector characteristics) , in the formal sector the differential appears to be due to unexplained factors 
(we can think of this as evidence of discrimination against women in the formal sector). When we 
adjust for selection, the main conclusions do not change for the formal sector (despite the fact that 
we have seen the selection term being significantly different from zero only for the formal sector in 
                                                 
22 In 2004 most sectorial coefficients turn out to be insignificant in the informal sector, except the coefficient for Other 
services and activities for women, showing a significant and positive effect on wages.  
23 The standard errors are calculated using the procedure developed by Jann (2005) for STATA. 2004) result remain valid, with an increase in the predicted differential in 2003 and a reduction in 
the predicted differential for 2004. For the informal sector, instead, the estimated gender differential 
becomes insignificant. However, given the increase of the imprecision of the predicted differential 
because of the introduction of the selection term in the regression and taking into account that the 
selection term is never significant in our regressions for the informal sector, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the correct decomposition results are unadjusted ones. 
Overall, these results seem to confirm the existence of gender “discrimination” in the formal 
sector. For the informal sector instead, maybe because of stronger competition between employers, 
earnings differentials appear to be in line with the different characteristics associated with the 
individual and with the type of job. This means that, if discriminatory behaviours take place, they  
might be in the form of vertical segregation, that is allowing men to have a faster career progression 
with respect to women and segregating women at the lower levels of the hierarchy
24. This however 
might also be simply the consequence of the greater desire of flexibility by women, self selecting 
themselves in positions characterized by lower responsibilities.  
6 Conclusions  
My aim in this work was twofold: 
-  verify to what extent the evidence is in line with the predictions given by the theory about 
labor market segmentation in developing countries; 
-  see how labor market segmentation, if it existed in Ukraine, contributed to the gender wage 
differential. 
In this work I have identified several differences in the patterns characterizing the participation 
of men and women to the labor market. These results, however, appear to show a picture of the 
                                                 
24 The literature on gender differences in risk aversion, for example, gives a possible explanation of why employers 
might discriminate women when they have to fill the higher ranks of the hierarchy. See Chauvin and Ash (1994)  and 
Powell and Ansic (1997). labor market that is very different from the one that characterizes labor markets of developing 
countries. Ukrainian women are on average much more educated than women in developing 
countries and they also tend to show higher participation rates, albeit smaller than men’s. They are 
also at least as educated as Ukrainian men. This explains why I find that a large share of women is 
working as manager, professional of technician. Looking at the determinants of informality I have 
found that women and men with identical characteristics might show different patterns of 
participation to informality with respect to men. This means that gender has an influence on the 
choice between formality and informality.  
This result reflects in different probabilities of women and men to move across states between 
the two periods under exam. This emerges clearly from the analysis of the transition matrices. Both 
men and women show higher propensity to go to the formal sector from the informal one than vice 
versa. However, this effect is much stronger for women than for men and this appears to depend 
both from different endowments than from different “behavioural” patterns. This result is 
surprising, as segmented labor market theories predict an higher concentration of women in the 
informal sector, both for demand side and supply side reasons.  
How does this translate in terms of gender earnings differential? Ukrainian women do not 
appear to earn less than Ukrainian men because of horizontal segregation, as the proportion of 
women in the informal sector is lower than that of men. This excludes that Ukrainian women might 
earn less because of a concentration in the “disadvantaged” informal sector. We find evidence of the 
fact that women actually choosing to be informal in the “upper tier” of the wage distribution (either 
as salaried or as self employed) earn more than those involuntarily informal, suggesting that 
informal labor market for women might be segmented in an “upper tier and a lower tier”.  
On average, Ukrainian women do earn less than men and this is true both in the informal and in 
the informal sector. However, when we decompose the gender earnings differential we find 
evidence of two very different patterns between the informal and the informal sectors. In the formal sector, the earnings differential is entirely due to the unexplained component, usually indicated as 
an indicator of  wage discrimination. In the informal sector, on the contrary, when the earnings 
differential is significantly different from zero, it is entirely due to differences in the explained 
component (personal, household and job characteristics). I interpret this as an indication that, 
probably because of the greater competition, in the informal sector it might be more difficult to 
discriminate women paying them less than men doing the same job and having the same 
characteristics. 
Overall, these results can be interpreted as the evidence that the Ukrainian labor market is 
indeed segmented and that women suffer some sort of discrimination. This discrimination is not 
taking place through the segregation of women in the informal sector but, more likely, through 
different remuneration of characteristics in the formals sector and different career opportunities and 
the exclusion of women from the better remunerated jobs at the top of the hierarchy. This might 
also explain why women in the upper tier of the wage  distribution experience higher earnings when 
they are self-employed compared than when they are salaried, both in the formal and in the informal 
sector.  
The Ukrainian government is officially fighting a battle to ensure that no discrimination takes 
place in the Ukrainian labor market. From the results of this paper, it appears that this battle is not 
unjustified. But government intervention alone cannot really change things, at least not in a short 
time. In the short to medium run, the increased competition for workers with higher skills, or the 
possibility to become self-employed are probably the two best opportunities for the women to see a 
reduction in the earnings gap.  
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 Tables 
Table 1. Labor market status, participation rate and employment rate by gender 
Sample  




rate  Share N  Ratio F/I 
% ∆ from 
previous 
year of F/I 
ratio 
2003 
Women 0.383  0.038  0.084  0.495  0.505  0.833  0.579  4739  10.197   
Men 0.483  0.057  0.111  0.350  0.650  0.830  0.421  3446  8.442   
2004 
Women 0.378  0.055  0.074  0.492  0.508  0.853  0.584  3974 6.863 -0.327 










Table 2. Distribution of characteristics in the sample 
 2003  2004 
  Total Formal  Informal  Total Formal  Informal 
    Females Males Females Males    Females Males Females Males 
All 
N.  obs.  3853 1815 1663  178  197  3392 1537 1356  242  257 
age  40.18 40.68 40.66 36.79 34.65 39.96 40.71 40.65 37.80 33.81 
secondary 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.72 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.60 
university 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.10 0.06 
tenure  9.76  11.23  9.61 2.99 3.34 8.98  11.16  8.78 2.99 2.09 
choice  0.02      0.22 0.20 0.03      0.17 0.20 
self  0.07 0.03 0.05 0.34 0.43 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.38 0.39 
Choice of being informal 
nobs  79    40  39  94    42  52 
age  32.90    33.85  31.92  33.33    35.29  31.75 
secondary 0.66      0.75 0.56 0.66      0.62 0.69 
university 0.10      0.10 0.10 0.11      0.21 0.02 
tenure  2.25      1.99 2.52 1.29      1.71 0.93 
Self-employed 
nobs  282  50 88 60 84  318  46 80 92  100 
age  38.26 38.36 37.73 40.18 37.39 39.51 39.61 38.95 42.91 36.79 
secondary 0.63 0.68 0.53 0.82 0.57 0.63 0.54 0.68 0.65 0.61 
university 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.35 0.30 0.07 0.08 












Table 3.  Mean and median earning differentials 
2003 
  Total    Formal   Informal  
 Females  Males 
% earnings 
differential
b Females Males 
% earnings 
differential





a  1.684 2.257 -25.4% 1.681 2.261 -25.7% 1.722 2.215 -22.2% 
Median earnings
a 1.333 1.875 -28.9% 1.333 1.875 -28.9% 1.250 1.708 -26.8% 
N. Obs.  1746  1498    1609  1362    137  136   
2004 
 Females  Males 
% earnings 
differential
b Females Males 
% earnings 
differential





a  2.166 2.889 -25.0% 2.213 2.891 -23.5% 1.840 2.878 -36.0% 
Median earnings
a 1.634 2.294 -28.7% 1.720 2.294 -25.0% 1.318 1.946 -32.3% 
N. Obs.  1568  1344    1371  1160    197  184   
Source:ULMS
  
a Real hourly earnings.  
bThe % earnings differential is calculated as follows: (wf-wm)/wm. A negative number indicates that women earn less than men. Table 4. Distribution of employed by sector (within gender) and gender differentials between median earningsa by sector 
  2003 2004 
  Formal Informal Formal Informal 
  Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Agrriculture  0.08 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.34 0.21 
Industry  0.22 0.38 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.40 0.08 0.16 
Construction  0.02 0.07 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.28 
Services  0.59 0.34 0.55 0.29 0.59 0.33 0.47 0.25 
Other  services  and  activities  0.09 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 
 
 Females  Males 
% earnings 
differential
b. Females Males 
% earnings 
differential
b Females Males 
% earnings 
differential




Agrriculture  1.13 0.90  0.25  0.63 0.92 -0.31 1.38 1.38  0.00  0.76 0.94 -0.18 
Industry  1.56 2.19  -0.29  1.88 2.34 -0.20 1.91 2.68 -0.29 1.67 2.29 -0.27 
Construction  1.77 2.00  -0.11  3.22 2.06  0.57  2.61 2.87 -0.09 2.87 2.39  0.20 
Services  1.28 1.75  -0.27  1.36 1.79 -0.24 1.59 2.29 -0.31 1.41 1.91 -0.26 
Other  services  and  activities  1.30 1.56  -0.17  1.61 1.15  0.41  1.61 1.86 -0.14 1.94 1.92  0.01 
Source:ULMS
  
a Real hourly earnings.  




Table 5. Distribution of employed by occupation (within gender) and gender differentials between median earningsa by sector 
 2003  2004 
 Formal  Informal  Formal  Informal 
  Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Managers  0.03 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.12 
Professionals  0.21 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.01 
Technicians  0.21 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.02 
Clerks  0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
Service  workers  and  shop  and  market  sales  0.10 0.04 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.38 0.06 
Skilled  agricultural,  forestry,  and  fishery  0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Craft  and  related  trades  workers  0.10 0.32 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.27 
Plant  and  machine  operators  and  assemblers  0.03 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.06 
Elementary  occupations  0.20 0.18 0.35 0.38 0.20 0.16 0.37 0.44 
 
  Females Males  Diff.  Females Males  Diff.  Females Males  Diff.  Females Males  Diff. 
Managers  1.88 2.44 -0.23 1.48 2.82 -0.47 2.80 3.44 -0.19 0.49 2.25 -0.78 
Professionals  1.89 2.20 -0.14 6.39 1.29 3.97 2.76 2.87 -0.04 2.87 5.10 -0.44 
Technicians  1.25 2.00 -0.38 1.72 2.42 -0.29 1.51 2.24 -0.33    5.73   
Clerks  1.38 1.50 -0.08 1.82 1.91 -0.05 1.81 2.09 -0.13 2.68 4.25 -0.37 
Service workers and shop and market sales  1.13  1.56  -0.28  1.25  1.15  0.09  1.27  1.72  -0.26  1.37  1.72  -0.20 
Skilled  agricultural,  forestry,  and  fishery  1.13 0.94 0.20 0.59 1.58 -0.62 1.26 1.15 0.10 0.84 1.15 -0.27 
Craft  and  related  trades  workers  1.37 2.03 -0.32 2.44 2.00 0.22 1.72 2.68 -0.36 2.46 2.87 -0.14 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers  1.81  1.88  -0.03    3.00    1.90  2.18  -0.13  0.82  2.87  -0.71 
Elementary  occupations  1.10 1.25 -0.12 1.07 1.14 -0.06 1.18 1.43 -0.18 1.06 1.37 -0.23 
Source:ULMS
  
a Real hourly earnings.  






 Table 6. Testing hypothesis of identical coefficients in female-male regressions 









employed  Salaried 
All coefficients jointly  reject**  reject** not  reject  reject*  reject***  reject* 
        
Individual  coefficients        
Age   reject***    reject*  reject**   
Secondary       reject**   
University  reject**       
Tenure     reject*     
Single  reject**  reject***      
D i v o r c e d   &   o t h e r s           
Children  <6   reject**       reject* 
C h i l d r e n   6 - 1 4         
Number of formal in household    reject**      reject***   
Working part time
a      reject**    reject* 
Source:ULMS
  
a working part time is not included in self employment regressions  
Table 7. Determinants of informality - All employed - 2003 
 Females  Males 
Age   0.009  0.030 
 (0.029)  (0.027) 
Age
2   -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Secondary   -0.195  -0.224 
 (0.129)  (0.098)** 
University   -0.779  -0.332 
 (0.166)***  (0.140)** 
Tenure   -0.082  -0.038 
 (0.028)***  (0.025) 
Tenure
2/100 -0.118  -0.167 
 (0.166)  (0.143) 
Single   0.001  0.476 
 (0.154)  (0.166)*** 
Divorced & other   -0.103  0.145 
 (0.121)  (0.168) 
Children<6 0.049  0.196 
 (0.168)  (0.152) 
Children>6 -0.174  0.095 
 (0.118)  (0.130) 
Formal in household  -0.239  -0.167 
 (0.068)***  (0.062)*** 
Part-time 0.572  0.545 
 (0.149)***  (0.184)*** 
Center-North 0.045  0.409 
 (0.200)  (0.200)** 
South 0.263  0.593 
 (0.199)  (0.202)*** 
East   0.209  0.306 
 (0.186)  (0.193) 
West   -0.042  0.278 
 (0.198)  (0.205) 
Constant -0.687  -1.715 
 (0.594)  (0.572)*** 
Observations 3828 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city  
  
Table 8. Determinants of informality – Self-employed - 2003 
 Females  Males 
Age   -0.334  0.192 
 (0.129)***  (0.072)*** 
Age
2   0.004  -0.002 
 (0.002)***  (0.001)** 
Secondary   0.113  -0.188 
 (0.423)  (0.276) 
University   -0.767  -0.607 
 (0.537)  (0.338)* 
Tenure   0.001  -0.223 
 (0.128)  (0.076)*** 
Tenure
2/100 -0.208  1.492 
 (0.927)  (0.512)*** 
Single   -1.507  1.804 
 (0.781)*  (0.486)*** 
Divorced & other   -0.436  0.228 
 (0.418)  (0.380) 
Children<6 -0.715  1.004 
 (0.775)  (0.366)*** 
Children>6 -0.332  0.272 
 (0.388)  (0.299) 
Formal in household  -0.435  0.013 
 (0.172)**  (0.145) 
Center-North -0.173  0.236 
 (0.852)  (0.757) 
South 0.285  0.597 
 (0.836)  (0.784) 
East   0.358  0.146 
 (0.816)  (0.764) 
West   0.126  0.284 
 (0.860)  (0.782) 
Constant 6.741  -4.373 
 (2.915)**  (1.680)*** 
Observations 273 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city 
  
Table 9. Determinants of informality – Salaried - 2003 
 Females  Males 
Age   0.050  -0.023 
 (0.033)  (0.032) 
Age
2   -0.001  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Secondary   -0.337  -0.278 
 (0.143)**  (0.114)** 
University   -0.859  -0.452 
 (0.190)***  (0.175)*** 
Tenure   -0.136  -0.036 
 (0.038)***  (0.041) 
Tenure
2/100 0.055  -0.394 
 (0.296)  (0.310) 
Single   0.171  0.292 
 (0.167)  (0.203) 
Divorced & other   0.150  0.070 
 (0.135)  (0.212) 
Children<6 0.164  0.060 
 (0.181)  (0.189) 
Children>6 -0.108  0.083 
 (0.137)  (0.168) 
Formal in household  -0.142  -0.181 
 (0.074)*  (0.075)** 
Part-time 0.474  0.236 
 (0.177)***  (0.285) 
Center-North -0.087  0.155 
 (0.221)  (0.224) 
South -0.024  0.327 
 (0.226)  (0.226) 
East   0.093  0.172 
 (0.201)  (0.210) 
West   -0.190  0.057 
 (0.217)  (0.231) 
Constant -1.310  -0.550 
 (0.674)*  (0.657) 
Observations 3555 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city 
  
Table 10. Determinants of informality – All-employed - 2004 
 Females  Males 
Age   -0.009  0.056 
 (0.026)  (0.026)** 
Age
2   0.000  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
Secondary   -0.508  -0.462 
 (0.119)***  (0.109)*** 
University   -0.992  -0.924 
 (0.152)***  (0.178)*** 
Tenure   -0.110  -0.129 
 (0.013)***  (0.019)*** 
Tenure
2/100 0.165  0.230 
 (0.029)***  (0.051)*** 
Single   0.086  0.220 
 (0.161)  (0.161) 
Divorced & other   -0.004  0.224 
 (0.113)  (0.165) 
Children<6 0.104  -0.156 
 (0.177)  (0.164) 
Children>6 0.044  -0.073 
 (0.121)  (0.138) 
Formal in household  -0.040  0.002 
 (0.027)  (0.008) 
Part-time 0.319  0.909 
 (0.166)*  (0.191)*** 
Center-North -0.265  0.168 
 (0.233)  (0.280) 
South 0.159  0.594 
 (0.243)  (0.296)** 
East   -0.170  0.116 
 (0.230)  (0.274) 
West   -0.451  0.152 
 (0.248)*  (0.285) 
Constant 0.167  -1.218 
 (0.568)  (0.558)** 
Observations 2988 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city 
  
Table 11. Determinants of informality – Self employed - 2004 
 Females  Males 
Age   -0.202  0.141 
 (0.114)*  (0.094) 
Age
2   0.003  -0.002 
 (0.001)**  (0.001) 
Secondary   -0.109  -1.299 
 (0.395)  (0.408)*** 
University   -1.813  -2.092 
 (0.558)***  (0.485)*** 
Tenure   -0.102  -0.134 
 (0.085)  (0.055)** 
Tenure
2/100 0.616  0.778 
 (0.381)  (0.302)** 
Single   0.889  1.398 
 (0.824)  (0.600)** 
Divorced & other   -0.617  0.126 
 (0.534)  (0.421) 
Children<6 0.097  0.810 
 (0.875)  (0.479)* 
Children>6 0.535  -0.166 
 (0.515)  (0.309) 
Formal in household  -0.413  0.001 
 (0.152)***  (0.017) 
Center-North -7.056  0.273 
 (0.433)***  (0.756) 
South -6.874***  0.330 
 (0.610)  (0.783) 
East   -7.127  0.122 
 (0.508)***  (0.768) 
West   -8.300  0.329 
 (0.573)***  (0.808) 
Constant 11.427  -1.729 
 (2.488)***  (2.001) 
Observations 243 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city 
  
Table 12. Determinants of informality – Salaried - 2004 
    
Age   0.043  0.052 
 (0.034)  (0.032) 
Age
2   -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)** 
Secondary   -0.428  -0.469 
 (0.140)***  (0.126)*** 
University   -0.826  -0.934 
 (0.180)***  (0.210)*** 
Tenure   -0.165  -0.203 
 (0.024)***  (0.033)*** 
Tenure
2/100 0.246  0.405 
 (0.041)***  (0.072)*** 
Single   0.198  0.053 
 (0.174)  (0.180) 
Divorced & other   0.224  0.251 
 (0.134)*  (0.190) 
Children<6 0.179  -0.338 
 (0.190)  (0.198)* 
Children>6 0.014  -0.162 
 (0.139)  (0.175) 
Formal in household  -0.030  -0.002 
 (0.023)  (0.009) 
Part-time 0.111  0.762 
 (0.196)  (0.275)*** 
Center-North -0.414  0.182 
 (0.273)  (0.338) 
South 0.029  0.485 
 (0.282)  (0.351) 
East   -0.088  0.178 
 (0.263)  (0.329) 
West   -0.323  0.263 
 (0.285)  (0.342) 
Constant -0.833  -1.045 
 (0.680)  (0.659) 
Observations 2745 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, married or cohabiting, Kyiv city Table 13. P, Q and V matrices built using observed transition probabilities 
MALES  FEMALES 
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij      TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij     
                  
 F  I  U  NLF  Pi.   F  I  U  NLF  Pi. 
Formal  0.855  0.042 0.035 0.067  0.492  Formal  0.865  0.022 0.036 0.077 0.384 
Informal   0.271  0.583  0.069 0.076  0.054  Informal    0.200  0.572  0.117 0.110 0.038 
Unemployed  0.253  0.174  0.368  0.205  0.107  Unemployed  0.248 0.094 0.313 0.345 0.080 
Not in labor force  0.072  0.037  0.097  0.795  0.347  Not in labor force  0.055  0.038  0.061  0.846  0.498 
P.j  0.488 0.083 0.094 0.335    P.j  0.387 0.056 0.074 0.483   
                   
                    
                  
  Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the destination 
state at the end of the period"    
Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the destination 
state at the end of the period"  
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    0.508  0.371 0.201    Formal    0.382  0.493 0.159   
Informal   0.555    0.739 0.228    Informal    0.517    1.589 0.229   
Unemployed 0.520  2.079    0.612   Unemployed  0.642  1.657    0.715  
Not in labor force  0.148  0.438  1.030      Not in labor force  0.141  0.682  0.824     
                   
                 
                   
V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector" 
V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector" 
 
                   
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    8.428  4.058 6.779    Formal    6.629  5.325 7.672   
Informal   9.214  2.808 2.667    Informal    8.966  5.408 3.474   
Unemployed 5.686  7.897    4.716   Unemployed  6.929  6.133    6.762  
Not in labor force  4.973  5.117  7.939      Not in labor force  6.799  10.358  7.795     
                   
Source:ULMS  
Note: Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period.  
Table 14. P, Q and V matrices built using observed transition probabilities 
MALES  FEMALES 
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij      TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij     
                  
 F  I  U  NLF  Pi.   F  I  U  NLF  Pi. 
Formal  0.899  0.022 0.030 0.048  0.492  Formal  0.889  0.012 0.031 0.067 0.384 
Informal   0.262  0.683  0.034 0.020  0.054  Informal    0.199  0.702  0.065 0.034 0.038 
Unemployed  0.249  0.168  0.378  0.205  0.107  Unemployed  0.252 0.068 0.326 0.353 0.080 
Not in labor force  0.045  0.024  0.060  0.871  0.347  Not in labor force  0.019  0.032  0.025  0.923  0.498 
P.j  0.499 0.074 0.078 0.349    P.j  0.379 0.053 0.053 0.515   
                   
                    
                  
    Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the destination 
state at the end of the period"    
Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the 
destination state at the end of the period"    
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    0.302  0.388 0.139    Formal    0.229  0.590 0.131   
Informal   0.526    0.441 0.058    Informal    0.526    1.218 0.067   
Unemployed 0.499  2.268    0.586   Unemployed  0.665  1.296    0.686  
Not in labor force  0.091  0.327  0.764      Not in labor force  0.051  0.616  0.468     
                   
                 
                   
V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector"    V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector" 
                   
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    9.424  6.168 10.641    Formal    6.937  7.921 15.409   
Informal   16.387   2.237 1.424    Informal    15.929   6.062 2.925   
Unemployed 7.933  11.509    7.304   Unemployed  8.920  6.986    13.288  
Not in labor force  6.947  7.980  9.518      Not in labor force  6.060  26.938  9.066     
Source:ULMS  
Note: Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
  
Table 15. Counterfactual P, Q and V matrices built using predicted transition probabilities 
MALES characteristics and FEMALE coefficients FEMALES  with  MALEScoefficients 
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij       TRANSITION PROBABILITIES : Pij     
                    
 F  I  U  NLF  Pi.   F  I  U  NLF  Pi. 
Formal  0.911  0.017 0.028  0.043  0.492  Formal  0.874  0.014  0.033 0.080 0.384 
Informal   0.270  0.676  0.036 0.018  0.054  Informal    0.215  0.699  0.055 0.030 0.038 
Unemployed  0.255  0.159 0.382 0.204  0.107  Unemployed  0.260  0.068  0.323 0.349 0.080 
Not in labor force  0.055  0.028  0.075  0.842  0.347  Not in labor force  0.016  0.029  0.021  0.934  0.498 
P.j  0.510 0.072  0.083  0.336   P.j  0.373 0.052  0.051  0.525   
                   
                     
                    
    Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the destination 
state at the end of the period"    
Q MATRIX: Pij/P.j - "Probability standardized by size of the 
destination state at the end of the period"    
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    0.242  0.338 0.129    Formal    0.267  0.643 0.152   
Informal   0.529    0.435 0.054    Informal    0.578    1.069 0.058   
Unemployed 0.500  2.225    0.606   Unemployed  0.699 1.317    0.665  
Not in labor force  0.108  0.391  0.908      Not in labor force  0.043  0.566  0.411     
                   
                     
                   
V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector"    V MATRIX: Pij / (P.j*(1-Pii)*(1-Pjj)) - "Disposition to move to a sector" 
                   
 F  I  U  NLF      F  I  U  NLF   
Formal    8.417  6.169 9.194    Formal    7.028  7.507 18.227   
Informal   18.428   2.175 1.045    Informal    15.216   5.256 2.927   
Unemployed 9.125  11.118    6.195   Unemployed  8.158 7.088    14.869  
Not in labor force  7.711  7.621  9.278      Not in labor force  5.099  28.542  9.198     
Source:ULMS  
Note: Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period.  
Table 16. Log hourly earnings – Females - 2003 
  OLS Without Selection  OLS With Selection 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Age    -0.021 0.014 -0.072 -0.007 
  (0.046) (0.007)* (0.071)  (0.015) 
Age
2   0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000)** (0.001)  (0.000) 
Secondary    -0.103 0.090 -0.137 0.059 
  (0.145) (0.041)** (0.158)  (0.045) 
University    0.246 0.408 0.488 0.334 
  (0.276) (0.049)*** (0.372) (0.068)*** 
Tenure    0.036 0.006 0.020 0.006 
  (0.060) (0.004) (0.069) (0.004) 
Tenure
2/100  -0.314 -0.008 -0.173 -0.007 
  (0.413) (0.011) (0.446) (0.011) 
Positive ∆
a  0.620 0.428 0.660 0.426 
  (0.180)*** (0.112)*** (0.179)*** (0.111)*** 
Negative ∆
b  -0.710 -0.604 -0.662 -0.611 
  (0.464) (0.069)*** (0.459) (0.069)*** 
Choice  Informality  0.061  0.108  
  (0.132)  (0.135)  
Self  Employed  0.062 0.202 0.084 0.197 
  (0.219) (0.164) (0.225) (0.163) 
Part  time  0.446 0.147 0.435 0.144 
  (0.211)** (0.057)** (0.210)** (0.057)** 
occupation4  -0.087 -0.054 -0.020 -0.056 
  (0.381) (0.040) (0.367) (0.040) 
occupation5  -0.362 -0.215 -0.315 -0.212 
  (0.245) (0.048)*** (0.236) (0.048)*** 
occupation6  -0.386 -0.102 -0.363 -0.103 
  (0.605) (0.154) (0.605) (0.153) 
occupation7  0.171 -0.068 0.440 -0.070 
  (0.391) (0.055) (0.415) (0.055) 
occupation8   0.040  0.041 
   (0.082)  (0.082) 
occupation9  -0.350 -0.181 -0.284 -0.179 
  (0.300) (0.037)*** (0.286) (0.037)*** 
Industry  0.944 0.291 0.969 0.288 
  (0.308)*** (0.060)*** (0.313)*** (0.060)*** 
Construction  1.493 0.264 1.276 0.256 
  (0.266)*** (0.111)** (0.297)*** (0.111)** 
Services  0.786 0.081 0.815 0.079 
  (0.260)*** (0.051) (0.258)*** (0.051) 
Other services and 
activities 
0.731 0.113 0.698 0.111 
  (0.298)** (0.066)* (0.310)** (0.066)* 
State  0.739 -0.196 0.847 -0.195 
  (0.317)** (0.043)*** (0.327)** (0.043)*** 
Privatized  -0.355 -0.148 -0.439 -0.148 
  (0.235)  (0.058)** (0.239)* (0.059)** 
Cooperative   -0.643  -0.779  -0.635 
    (0.142)*** (0.329)** (0.139)*** 
Center  North  -0.144 -0.336 -0.113 -0.334 
  (0.340) (0.053)*** (0.350) (0.053)*** 
South    -0.089 -0.224 -0.011 -0.227 
  (0.276) (0.057)*** (0.285) (0.057)*** 
East    -0.253 -0.312 -0.171 -0.313 
  (0.242) (0.051)*** (0.252) (0.051)*** 
West  -0.249 -0.237 -0.218 -0.235 
  (0.318) (0.053)*** (0.318) (0.053)***  
lambda021    -0.698   
     (0.665)   
lambda011     -0.132 
       (0.081) 
Constant  0.301 0.316 2.430 0.825 
  (0.956) (0.163)* (2.561)  (0.360)** 
Observations 131 1573 131 1572 
R-squared  0.34 0.29 0.35 0.29 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
  
Table 17. Log hourly earnings – Females - 2004 
  OLS Without Selection  OLS With Selection 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Age   0.031  0.001  -0.002  -0.019 
  (0.032) (0.008) (0.048) (0.019) 
Age
2   -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Secondary    0.051 0.120 0.143 0.082 
  (0.145) (0.050)** (0.155)  (0.058) 
University    0.148 0.536 0.370 0.458 
  (0.191) (0.068)*** (0.258) (0.092)*** 
Tenure    -0.022 0.012 -0.026 0.012 
  (0.035) (0.004)*** (0.034) (0.004)*** 
Tenure
2/100  0.006 -0.022 0.024 -0.021 
  (0.125) (0.009)** (0.121) (0.009)** 
Positive ∆
a   0.599  0.593 
   (0.130)***  (0.128)*** 
Negative ∆
b  -0.814 -0.559 -0.725 -0.559 
 (0.469)*  (0.133)***  (0.539)  (0.132)*** 
Choice  Informality  0.266  0.280  
  (0.150)*  (0.151)*  
Self  Employed  0.435 0.277 0.446 0.267 
  (0.260)* (0.253) (0.266)* (0.250) 
Part  time  0.511 0.054 0.515 0.066 
  (0.243)** (0.079) (0.244)** (0.081) 
occupation4  0.542 -0.094 0.566 -0.103 
  (0.418) (0.051)* (0.420)  (0.052)** 
occupation5  0.216 -0.277 0.261 -0.274 
  (0.352) (0.067)*** (0.349) (0.068)*** 
occupation6   -0.222  -0.220 
   (0.139)  (0.138) 
occupation7  0.956 -0.018 1.030 -0.019 
  (0.363)*** (0.058) (0.354)*** (0.058) 
occupation8   0.069  0.071 
   (0.095)  (0.095) 
occupation9  0.275 -0.260 0.314 -0.260 
  (0.302) (0.048)*** (0.296) (0.048)*** 
Industry  0.467 0.193 0.486 0.191 
  (0.313) (0.057)*** (0.321) (0.057)*** 
Construction  0.614 0.199 0.654 0.218 
  (0.412) (0.100)** (0.420) (0.103)** 
Services  0.393 0.151 0.395 0.149 
  (0.282) (0.050)*** (0.281) (0.050)*** 
Other services and 
activities 
0.825 0.102 0.833 0.106 
  (0.340)** (0.072) (0.342)** (0.072) 
State  -0.584 -0.057 -0.483 -0.050 
 (0.248)**  (0.049)  (0.294)  (0.049) 
Privatized  -0.081 0.030 -0.096 0.032 
  (0.180) (0.056) (0.184) (0.056) 
Cooperative   0.106  0.111 
   (0.301)  (0.294) 
Center  North  -0.511 -0.184 -0.550 -0.183 
  (0.285)* (0.072)** (0.292)* (0.072)** 
South    -0.243 -0.100 -0.279 -0.093 
  (0.277) (0.079) (0.278) (0.079) 
East    -0.442 -0.268 -0.478 -0.269 
  (0.252)* (0.068)*** (0.258)* (0.068)*** 
West  -0.390 -0.237 -0.420 -0.235 
  (0.294) (0.072)*** (0.294) (0.072)*** lambda021    -0.445   
     (0.386)   
lambda011     -0.127 
       (0.103) 
Constant  -0.425 0.479 0.830 0.989 
  (0.649) (0.191)** (1.411) (0.470)** 
Observations 162 1222 161 1213 
R-squared  0.38 0.27 0.36 0.27 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
  
Table 18. Log hourly earnings – Males - 2003 
  OLS Without Selection  OLS With Selection 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Age    -0.017 0.007 0.018 -0.021 
  (0.037) (0.010) (0.052) (0.017) 
Age
2    0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Secondary    0.142 0.086 0.031 0.052 
  (0.201) (0.043)** (0.215)  (0.046) 
University    0.267 0.238 0.156 0.156 
 (0.277)  (0.073)***  (0.276)  (0.083)* 
Tenure    0.066 0.013 0.070 0.013 
  (0.059) (0.006)** (0.060) (0.006)** 
Tenure
2/100  -0.699 -0.028 -0.730 -0.028 
  (0.384)* (0.016)* (0.388)* (0.016)* 
Positive ∆
a   0.487  0.483 
   (0.141)***  (0.142)*** 
Negative ∆
b  -0.523 -0.674 -0.551 -0.679 
  (0.440) (0.088)*** (0.435) (0.088)*** 
Choice  Informality  -0.002  0.040  
  (0.191)  (0.199)  
Self  Employed  0.145 0.185 0.159 0.192 
  (0.198) (0.155) (0.204) (0.155) 
Part  time  0.220 0.097 0.173 0.097 
  (0.290) (0.113) (0.291) (0.114) 
occupation4  -0.353 -0.280 -0.253 -0.270 
  (0.457) (0.100)*** (0.466) (0.100)*** 
occupation5  -0.926 -0.170 -0.845 -0.166 
  (0.314)***  (0.111) (0.335)** (0.110) 
occupation6  -0.086 -0.422 -0.090 -0.424 
  (0.681) (0.128)*** (0.672) (0.128)*** 
occupation7  -0.383 -0.088 -0.393 -0.089 
  (0.325) (0.059) (0.319) (0.059) 
occupation8  -0.084 -0.085 -0.097 -0.089 
  (0.279) (0.069) (0.282) (0.069) 
occupation9  -0.262 -0.319 -0.285 -0.316 
  (0.270) (0.067)*** (0.265) (0.067)*** 
Industry  0.887 0.615 0.883 0.619 
  (0.283)*** (0.067)*** (0.286)*** (0.067)*** 
Construction  0.512 0.473 0.502 0.480 
  (0.309) (0.093)*** (0.303) (0.092)*** 
Services  0.781 0.418 0.754 0.417 
  (0.292)***  (0.068)*** (0.292)** (0.067)*** 
Other services and 
activities 
0.545 0.400 0.542 0.401 
  (0.337) (0.093)*** (0.332) (0.092)*** 
State  -0.599 0.032 -0.752 0.031 
  (0.416)  (0.056) (0.378)** (0.056) 
Privatized  -0.615 0.000 -0.566 -0.004 
  (0.253)** (0.065) (0.260)** (0.064) 
Cooperative   -0.492  -0.402  -0.476 
   (0.176)***  (0.471)  (0.176)*** 
Center  North  -0.848 -0.362 -0.852 -0.355 
  (0.357)** (0.070)*** (0.360)** (0.070)*** 
South    -0.640 -0.324 -0.638 -0.314 
  (0.364)* (0.075)*** (0.358)* (0.074)*** 
East    -0.507 -0.208 -0.537 -0.206 
  (0.357) (0.067)*** (0.354) (0.066)*** 
West  -0.317 -0.301 -0.339 -0.302 
  (0.380) (0.070)*** (0.375) (0.070)***  
lambda021     0.686  
     (0.669)   
lambda011     -0.238 
       (0.117)** 
Constant 0.969  0.370  -0.712  1.066 
  (0.891) (0.198)* (1.943)  (0.396)*** 
Observations 131 1312 131 1311 
R-squared  0.34 0.31 0.34 0.31 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
  
Table 19. Log hourly earnings – Males - 2004 
  OLS Without Selection  OLS With Selection  (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Age    -0.075 0.025 -0.096 0.011 
  (0.034)** (0.010)** (0.046)**  (0.017) 
Age
2    0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000)*  (0.000)***  (0.001)*  (0.000) 
Secondary    0.202 0.147 0.186 0.129 
 (0.135)  (0.051)***  (0.191)  (0.056)** 
University    0.066 0.341 0.130 0.297 
  (0.287) (0.076)*** (0.389) (0.092)*** 
Tenure    -0.027 0.009 -0.020 0.009 
  (0.045) (0.006) (0.047) (0.006) 
Tenure
2/100  0.168 -0.011 0.135 -0.012 
  (0.183) (0.015) (0.189) (0.015) 
Positive ∆
a   0.119  0.115 
   (0.209)  (0.211) 
Negative ∆
b  -0.942 -0.767 -0.858 -0.721 
  (0.289)*** (0.134)*** (0.294)*** (0.132)*** 
Choice  Informality  0.100  0.141  
  (0.153)  (0.163)  
Self  Employed  0.366 0.010 0.424 0.010 
  (0.173)** (0.148) (0.178)** (0.148) 
Part time  0.055  -0.044  -0.001  -0.049 
  (0.325) (0.141) (0.335) (0.148) 
occupation4  0.250 -0.136 0.882 -0.152 
 (0.472)  (0.091)  (0.315)***  (0.095) 
occupation5  -0.138 -0.189 -0.187 -0.187 
  (0.315) (0.115) (0.315) (0.116) 
occupation6  0.437 -0.583 0.473 -0.597 
  (0.336) (0.148)*** (0.343) (0.150)*** 
occupation7  0.004 -0.099 0.015 -0.105 
  (0.251) (0.056)* (0.251) (0.056)* 
occupation8  0.064 -0.142 0.068 -0.137 
  (0.343) (0.070)** (0.350)  (0.071)* 
occupation9  -0.566 -0.427 -0.563 -0.434 
  (0.232)** (0.078)*** (0.237)** (0.078)*** 
Industry  0.237 0.464 0.255 0.478 
  (0.267) (0.074)*** (0.272) (0.074)*** 
Construction  0.252 0.419 0.263 0.437 
  (0.273) (0.092)*** (0.278) (0.094)*** 
Services  0.184 0.223 0.174 0.246 
  (0.266) (0.070)*** (0.266) (0.070)*** 
Other services and 
activities 
0.041 0.156 0.263 0.157 
  (0.311) (0.094)* (0.349) (0.092)* 
State  0.044 0.106 0.077 0.101 
  (0.264) (0.062)* (0.259)  (0.062) 
Privatized  0.264 0.005 0.292 0.005 
  (0.178) (0.066) (0.192) (0.066) 
Cooperative  0.800 -0.157 0.725 -0.207 
  (0.282)***  (0.212) (0.310)** (0.246) 
Center  North  -0.668 -0.498 -0.683 -0.501 
  (0.262)** (0.113)*** (0.271)** (0.113)*** 
South    -1.020 -0.456 -1.061 -0.461 
  (0.318)*** (0.116)*** (0.324)*** (0.116)*** 
East    -0.539 -0.392 -0.585 -0.396 
  (0.239)** (0.106)*** (0.246)** (0.106)*** 
West  -0.502 -0.440 -0.458 -0.435 
  (0.307) (0.112)*** (0.316) (0.112)***  
lambda021    -0.077   
     (0.410)   
lambda011     -0.130 
       (0.115) 
Constant  2.524 0.500 2.978 0.848 
  (0.761)***  (0.224)** (1.285)** (0.416)** 
Observations 164 1020 156 1004 
R-squared  0.30 0.29 0.33 0.29 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
 Table 20. Quantile regressions 10th , median and and 90th percentile – Females - 2003 
 Informal  Formal 
  P10 Median P90  P10 Median P90 
Age    0.003 0.025 -0.019 0.011 0.013 0.015 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.072) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
Age
2    -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary    0.140 0.001 -0.182 0.013 0.097 0.125 
  (0.254) (0.228) (0.325) (0.046)  (0.040)**  (0.077) 
University    0.244 0.179 0.143 0.188 0.432 0.454 
 (0.335)  (0.336)  (0.591)  (0.051)*** (0.055)*** (0.097)*** 
Tenure   -0.006  -0.000  0.047  0.007  0.004  0.014 
  (0.092) (0.080) (0.112) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007)** 
Tenure
2/100 0.030  0.159  -0.741  -0.014  -0.003  -0.022 
  (0.841) (0.759) (1.409) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) 
Positive ∆
a  0.678 0.619 0.101 0.337 0.406 0.602 
  (0.480) (0.299)** (0.234)  (0.129)*** (0.148)***  (0.339)* 
Negative ∆
b -0.834  -0.775  -1.345  -0.956 -0.507 -0.496 
 (0.813)  (0.749)  (0.791)*  (0.127)*** (0.077)*** (0.105)*** 
Choice Informality  -0.088  0.125  0.173       
 (0.211)  (0.209)  (0.279)       
Self Employed  -0.151  -0.018  0.326  -0.015  0.131  1.170 
  (0.350) (0.276) (0.419) (0.312) (0.176)  (0.387)*** 
Part  time  1.089 0.621 0.018 0.009 0.097 0.214 
 (0.429)**  (0.273)**  (0.375)  (0.061)  (0.081)  (0.095)** 
occupation4  0.782 -0.030 -0.962 -0.027 -0.074 -0.056 
  (0.563) (0.573) (0.725) (0.059) (0.050) (0.082) 
occupation5  0.428 -0.220 -1.203 -0.251 -0.202 -0.257 
 (0.455)  (0.375)  (0.568)**  (0.073)*** (0.059)*** (0.092)*** 
occupation6  -0.037 0.135 -0.906 -0.781 -0.073 -0.202 
  (0.668) (0.997) (1.016) (0.601) (0.102) (0.277) 
occupation7 1.024  0.387  -0.503  -0.210  -0.075  0.145 
  (0.695) (0.679) (0.974)  (0.070)***  (0.069) (0.093) 
occupation8   -0.065    -0.124  -0.238  -0.015 
   (0.442)    (0.111)  (0.075)***  (0.224) 
occupation9 0.297    -1.148  -0.163  0.092  -0.211 
 (0.444)    (0.554)**  (0.045)***  (0.133)  (0.091)** 
Industry  0.445 -0.202 0.555 0.438 -0.181 0.167 
 (0.575)  (0.418)  (0.591)  (0.128)*** (0.039)***  (0.087)* 
Construction  1.538 0.914 0.760 0.482 0.206 0.157 
 (0.832)*  (0.480)*  (0.749)  (0.216)** (0.061)***  (0.155) 
Services 0.685  1.491  0.696  0.242  0.220  -0.002 
 (0.391)*  (0.696)**  (0.401)* (0.123)** (0.124)*  (0.074) Other services and 
activities 
-0.044 0.735 0.586 0.296 -0.015 -0.004 
  (0.617) (0.351)** (0.487) (0.141)** (0.040)  (0.094) 
State  1.133 0.609 -0.298 -0.047 0.019 -0.259 
  (0.774) (0.463) (0.654) (0.076) (0.068)  (0.077)*** 
Privatized  -1.053 0.985 -0.820 -0.025 -0.221 -0.035 
 (0.515)**  (0.537)*  (0.556)  (0.096) (0.069)*** (0.119) 
Cooperative   -0.227    -0.016  -0.226  -0.735 
   (0.349)    (0.155)  (0.076)***  (0.287)** 
Center North  -1.000    0.281  -0.168  -0.719  -0.455 
  (0.670)  (0.698)  (0.059)***  (0.269)***  (0.113)*** 
South    -0.590 -0.151 -0.494 -0.135 -0.300 -0.304 
 (0.698)  (0.427)  (0.502)  (0.047)*** (0.077)*** (0.112)*** 
East    -0.521 0.042 -0.442 -0.172 -0.199 -0.411 
 (0.613)  (0.406)  (0.502)  (0.052)*** (0.084)** (0.115)*** 
West  -0.942 -0.239 -0.208 -0.095 -0.288 -0.287 
 (0.667)  (0.372)  (0.597)  (0.048)** (0.073)*** (0.130)** 
Constant -0.732  -0.603  1.901  -0.420  0.392  0.966 
 (1.332)  (1.332)  (1.346)  (0.247)* (0.231)*  (0.301)*** 
Observations 131  131 131 1573  1573  1573 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly established enterprises, Kyiv city  
Table 21. Quantile regressions 10th , median and and 90th percentile – Females - 2004 
 Informal  Formal 
  P10 Median P90  P10 Median P90 
Age    -0.000 0.032 0.048 -0.001 0.008 0.011 
  (0.048) (0.037) (0.050) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) 
Age
2    0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary   -0.168  -0.078  0.097  0.192  0.071  0.062 
  (0.206) (0.161) (0.223)  (0.113)*  (0.045) (0.125) 
University   -0.184  -0.052  -0.420  0.440  0.454  0.663 
 (0.327)  (0.257)  (0.364)  (0.131)*** (0.058)*** (0.173)*** 
Tenure   -0.067  -0.014  -0.084  0.007  0.008  0.015 
  (0.059) (0.056) (0.072) (0.005)  (0.004)**  (0.009)* 
Tenure
2/100 0.149  -0.053  0.203  -0.007  -0.017  -0.032 
  (0.244) (0.207) (0.301) (0.011)  (0.009)*  (0.022) 
Positive ∆
a     0.528  0.802  0.246 
       (0.194)***  (0.265)***  (0.135)* 
Negative ∆
b -1.932  -1.476  -0.078  -1.217 -0.520 -0.009 
 (0.791)**  (0.798)*  (0.721)  (0.247)*** (0.115)***  (0.324) 
Choice Informality  0.137  0.266  0.605       
 (0.216)  (0.192)  (0.255)**       
Self  Employed  -0.441 0.169 1.479 -0.487 0.310 1.228 
 (0.449)  (0.321)  (0.611)**  (0.325)  (0.266)  (0.723)* 
Part  time  -0.295 0.497 0.279 -0.074 0.099 0.081 
  (0.456) (0.393) (0.512) (0.081) (0.095) (0.160) 
occupation4 1.183  0.809  0.631  -0.194  -0.103  -0.003 
 (0.789)  (0.644)  (0.908)  (0.056)*** (0.057)*  (0.158) 
occupation5 0.995  0.162  0.472  -0.325  -0.283  -0.376 
 (0.626)  (0.490)  (0.735)  (0.121)*** (0.059)*** (0.113)*** 
occupation6       -0.361  -0.246  -0.230 
       (0.199)*  (0.170)  (0.384) 
occupation7 1.688  0.803  0.596  -0.072  -0.088  0.008 
  (0.690)**  (0.544) (0.686) (0.076) (0.062) (0.108) 
occupation8       -0.025  -0.043  0.164 
       (0.152)  (0.112)  (0.233) 
occupation9 0.465  0.223  0.358  -0.238  -0.259  -0.293 
 (0.591)  (0.433)  (0.670)  (0.064)*** (0.041)*** (0.106)*** 
Industry  0.009 0.296 1.252 0.066 0.275 0.264 
 (0.600)  (0.423)  (0.663)*  (0.077) (0.056)***  (0.132)** 
Construction -0.424  0.660 1.361 0.232 0.240 0.144 
  (0.755) (0.620) (0.928) (0.146)  (0.127)*  (0.184) 
Services -0.426  0.275  0.485  0.016  0.131  0.278   (0.537) (0.367) (0.552) (0.058)  (0.047)***  (0.114)** 
Other services and 
activities 
-1.068 0.394 1.321 0.007 0.116 0.207 
 (0.643)*  (0.556)  (0.591)**  (0.097)  (0.073)  (0.158) 
State  -0.041 -0.464 -0.419 0.041 -0.082 -0.063 
  (0.687) (0.537) (0.824) (0.086) (0.052) (0.106) 
Privatized -0.014  -0.194  0.349  0.046  0.050  0.002 
  (0.305) (0.249) (0.381) (0.114) (0.058) (0.101) 
Cooperative       -0.295  0.375  0.043 
       (0.627)  (0.322)  (0.233) 
Center North  -0.289  -0.690  -0.315 -0.146 -0.119 -0.035 
  (0.475) (0.467) (0.523)  (0.086)*  (0.096) (0.149) 
South    0.159 -0.430 0.221 -0.144 -0.003 0.080 
  (0.490) (0.466) (0.500)  (0.085)*  (0.118) (0.178) 
East    -0.264 -0.547 -0.342 -0.258 -0.166 -0.221 
 (0.480)  (0.429)  (0.445)  (0.081)*** (0.094)*  (0.135) 
West  -0.508 -0.421 -0.507 -0.179 -0.182 -0.205 
 (0.556)  (0.487)  (0.473)  (0.084)**  (0.099)*  (0.152) 
Constant -0.274  -0.078  -0.724  0.020  0.291  0.831 
  (0.961) (0.828) (1.202) (0.230) (0.225)  (0.388)** 
Observations 162  162 162 1222  1222  1222 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 














Table 22. Quantile regressions 10th , median and and 90th percentile –Males - 2003 
 Informal  Formal 
  P10 Median P90  P10 Median P90 
Age    -0.041 -0.044 0.005 -0.008 0.024 0.034 
  (0.077) (0.055) (0.066) (0.013)  (0.011)**  (0.015)** 
Age
2    0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Secondary    0.165 -0.029 -0.013 0.017 0.109 0.047 
  (0.363) (0.278) (0.221) (0.071)  (0.043)**  (0.077) 
University    0.262 0.016 -0.008 0.117 0.241 0.193 
  (0.551) (0.403) (0.394) (0.073)  (0.071)***  (0.122) 
Tenure    0.006 0.040 0.120 0.016 0.009 0.000 
  (0.137) (0.098) (0.093) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tenure
2/100  0.014 -0.555 -0.979 -0.036 -0.008 -0.002 
  (1.009) (0.716) (0.806) (0.032) (0.019) (0.019) 
Positive ∆
a        0.512 0.447 0.725 
        (0.208)** (0.176)** (0.359)** 
Negative ∆
b  -1.219 -0.427 0.644 -1.048 -0.650 -0.419 
  (0.848) (0.726) (0.871)  (0.193)*** (0.102)*** (0.110)*** 
Choice Informality  -0.241  0.027  -0.124       
  (0.358) (0.313) (0.290)       
Self  Employed  -0.096 0.247 0.378 -0.371 0.119 0.602 
  (0.375) (0.286) (0.334)  (0.210)*  (0.199)  (0.359)* 
Part  time  -0.109 0.140 0.422 0.111 -0.057 0.400 
  (0.570) (0.425) (0.420) (0.133) (0.078) (0.342) 
occupation4  -0.811 0.302 -0.659 -0.319 -0.277 -0.208 
  (0.917) (0.803) (0.688)  (0.100)*** (0.114)**  (0.163) 
occupation5  -0.888 -0.843 -1.426 -0.060 -0.130 -0.296 
  (0.551) (0.544)  (0.553)**  (0.176) (0.147) (0.196) 
occupation6  -0.929 -0.100 -0.270 -0.562 -0.420 -0.427 
  (1.268) (1.060) (0.656)  (0.262)** (0.106)***  (0.237)* 
occupation7  -0.310 -0.163 -0.461 -0.154 -0.073 -0.102 
  (0.661) (0.474) (0.407)  (0.077)**  (0.056) (0.092) 
occupation8  0.278  0.095 -0.573 -0.200 -0.055 -0.092 
  (0.513) (0.466) (0.463)  (0.106)*  (0.075) (0.113) 
occupation9  -0.512 -0.352 -0.487 -0.415 -0.335 -0.367 
  (0.562) (0.432) (0.344)  (0.083)*** (0.064)*** (0.114)*** 
Industry  1.247 0.496 0.421 0.749 0.510 0.555 
 (0.686)*  (0.426)  (0.395)  (0.108)*** (0.060)*** (0.118)*** 
Construction  0.565 0.413 0.660 0.580 0.319 0.453 
 (0.666)  (0.442)  (0.329)**  (0.125)*** (0.146)** (0.137)*** 
Services  1.359 0.550 1.085 0.528 0.278 0.409  (0.570)**  (0.445)  (0.285)***  (0.111)*** (0.063)*** (0.125)*** 
Other services and 
activities 
0.480 0.606 0.759 0.477 0.212 0.485 
  (0.661) (0.490) (0.573)  (0.148)*** (0.101)**  (0.197)** 
State  -0.154 -0.678 -0.916 0.095 -0.056 0.028 
  (0.985) (0.704) (1.084) (0.091) (0.072) (0.102) 
Privatized  -0.642 -0.494 -0.860 0.154 -0.052 -0.068 
  (0.623) (0.406)  (0.374)**  (0.084)*  (0.079) (0.113) 
Cooperative   -0.788  -0.164  -0.372  -0.771 
   (0.555)  (0.285)  (0.073)***  (0.288)*** 
Center  North  -1.361    -0.375 -0.125 -0.294 -0.371 
  (0.764)*    (0.542) (0.097) (0.294)  (0.157)** 
South    -0.148 -0.847 -0.888 -0.058 -0.399 -0.308 
 (0.683)  (0.558)  (0.511)*  (0.109) (0.082)***  (0.168)* 
East    -0.515 -0.443 -0.474 -0.093 -0.185 -0.199 
  (0.649) (0.536) (0.561) (0.102)  (0.075)**  (0.149) 
West  -0.072 -0.142 -0.037 -0.159 -0.308 -0.269 
  (0.794) (0.544) (0.469) (0.103)  (0.082)***  (0.159)* 
Constant 0.283  1.717  1.584  -0.228  0.225  0.667 
  (1.750) (1.390) (1.382) (0.269) (0.231)  (0.373)* 
Observations  131 131 131  1312  1312  1312 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly established enterprises, Kyiv city  
Table 23. Quantile regressions 10th , median and and 90th percentile –Males - 2004 
 Informal  Formal 
  P10 Median P90  P10 Median P90 
Age    -0.093  -0.102 0.020 0.019 0.029 0.036 
 (0.071)  (0.044)**  (0.062)  (0.016) (0.011)***  (0.019)* 
Age
2    0.001  0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
Secondary    -0.094 0.247 0.483 0.189 0.131 0.248 
 (0.257)  (0.180)  (0.272)*  (0.090)** (0.055)** (0.123)** 
University    0.474 0.137 -0.052 0.313 0.313 0.599 
  (0.626) (1.436) (1.337)  (0.116)*** (0.078)*** (0.173)*** 
Tenure    0.067 -0.035 -0.001 0.008 0.016 0.015 
  (0.114) (0.105) (0.127) (0.010)  (0.006)***  (0.015) 
Tenure
2/100  -0.200 0.176 -0.003 -0.014 -0.022 -0.026 
  (0.832) (0.998) (1.034) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036) 
Positive ∆
a     -0.145  0.180  -0.252 
        (0.433) (0.368) (0.229) 
Negative ∆
b  -0.352 -0.376 -2.190 -1.151 -0.749 -0.273 
 (0.420)  (0.549)  (0.864)**  (0.170)*** (0.204)***  (0.183) 
Choice Informality  0.085  0.046  -0.171       
  (0.353) (0.204) (0.295)       
Self Employed  0.104  0.393  0.325  -0.294  0.126  0.157 
  (0.441)  (0.230)*  (0.240) (0.372) (0.127) (0.313) 
Part  time  0.308  0.134 -0.177 -0.188 -0.020 0.578 
  (0.844) (0.489) (0.518) (0.152) (0.225) (0.425) 
occupation4  0.276  0.612 -0.570 -0.143 -0.123 -0.299 
  (0.691) (0.611) (0.606) (0.134) (0.105) (0.284) 
occupation5  0.412 -0.469 0.327 -0.187 -0.283 -0.076 
  (0.471) (0.535) (0.806) (0.293)  (0.135)**  (0.217) 
occupation6  1.415  0.807 -0.607 -0.806 -0.437 -0.737 
 (0.800)*  (0.478)*  (0.634)  (0.299)*** (0.175)** (0.270)*** 
occupation7  0.101  0.082 -0.138 -0.107 -0.042 -0.227 
  (0.557) (0.388) (0.437) (0.086) (0.063)  (0.103)** 
occupation8  -0.032 0.133  0.253 -0.203 -0.168 -0.037 
  (0.675) (0.501) (0.633)  (0.098)**  (0.073)**  (0.156) 
occupation9  -0.310 -0.457 -0.661 -0.530 -0.400 -0.419 
  (0.403) (0.352) (0.442)  (0.122)*** (0.077)*** (0.127)*** 
Industry  0.516 0.485 0.016 0.528 0.446 0.442 
  (0.445) (0.387) (0.431)  (0.124)*** (0.072)*** (0.170)*** 
Construction  0.244 0.511 -0.334 0.320 0.399 0.374 
  (0.396) (0.390) (0.473)  (0.183)* (0.098)*** (0.198)* 
Services  0.314 0.489 0.049 0.173 0.291 0.156   (0.432) (0.417) (0.452) (0.121)  (0.072)***  (0.156) 
Other services and 
activities 
-0.117 0.408 -0.736 0.179 0.089 0.214 
  (0.586) (0.485) (0.571) (0.177) (0.114) (0.195) 
State  0.474 0.343 0.303 0.089 0.027 0.097 
  (0.592) (0.427) (0.637) (0.101) (0.060) (0.130) 
Privatized  0.450 0.243 -0.033 0.026 -0.014 -0.044 
  (0.423) (0.265) (0.315) (0.111) (0.068) (0.127) 
Cooperative  1.422 1.100 -0.130 0.194 -0.193 0.241 
  (0.786)*  (0.499)**  (0.414) (0.300) (0.297) (0.545) 
Center  North  -1.042 -0.905 0.157 -0.456 -0.521 -0.301 
  (0.590)* (0.548)  (0.503) (0.257)* (0.088)***  (0.196) 
South    -1.298 -1.062 -0.691 -0.299 -0.574 -0.097 
 (0.736)*  (0.585)*  (0.521)  (0.247) (0.090)*** (0.233) 
East    -0.659 -0.567 -0.228 -0.353 -0.426 -0.212 
  (0.612) (0.533) (0.492) (0.258)  (0.082)***  (0.199) 
West  -0.739 -0.617 0.217 -0.407 -0.544 -0.227 
  (0.653) (0.569) (0.537) (0.252)  (0.094)***  (0.223) 
Constant 2.156  2.573  1.686  -0.119  0.493  0.796 
  (1.634) (1.109)** (1.127)  (0.426) (0.240)** (0.486) 
Observations  164 164 164  1020  1020  1020 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 24. Robust regression – Females - 2003 
 Informal  Formal 
Age   -0.001  0.012 
 (0.042)  (0.007)* 
Age
2   -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)** 
Secondary   -0.068  0.095 
 (0.181)  (0.037)*** 
University   0.074  0.399 
 (0.277)  (0.045)*** 
Tenure   0.006  0.006 
 (0.058)  (0.004) 
Tenure
2/100 0.019  -0.008 
 (0.447)  (0.010) 
Positive ∆
a   0.357 
   (0.082)*** 
Negative ∆
b -0.669  -0.515 
 (0.442)  (0.048)*** 
Choice Informality  0.023   
 (0.178)   
Self Employed  -0.089  0.008 
 (0.204)  (0.084) 
Part time  0.605  0.080 
 (0.229)***  (0.046)* 
occupation4 -0.114  -0.073 
 (0.444)  (0.039)* 
occupation5 -0.247  -0.245 
 (0.253)  (0.043)*** 
occupation6 -0.692  -0.041 
 (0.400)*  (0.111) 
occupation7 0.161  -0.044 
 (0.446)  (0.045) 
occupation8 0.000  0.084 
 (0.000)  (0.076) 
occupation9 -0.298  -0.198 
 (0.236)  (0.036)*** 
Industry 0.896  0.190 
 (0.326)***  (0.049)*** 
Construction 1.459  0.264 
 (0.557)**  (0.088)*** 
Services 0.722  0.006 
 (0.207)***  (0.043) 
Other services and activities  0.705  0.026 
 (0.277)**  (0.056) 
State 0.822  -0.201 
 (0.547)  (0.040)*** 
Privatized -0.245  -0.138 
 (0.296)  (0.053)*** 
Cooperative   -0.669 
   (0.184)*** 
Center North  -0.411  -0.288 
 (0.310)  (0.045)*** 
South   -0.124  -0.187 
 (0.312)  (0.048)*** 
East   -0.322  -0.273 
 (0.278)  (0.043)*** 
West -0.503  -0.213 
 (0.306)  (0.045)***   67
Constant 0.207  0.389 
 (0.808)  (0.149)*** 
Observations 131  1573 
R-squared 0.38  0.29 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
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Table 25. Robust regression – Females - 2004 
 Informal  Formal 
Age   0.006  0.005 
 (0.029)  (0.008) 
Age
2   -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Secondary   0.026  0.117 
 (0.137)  (0.046)** 
University   0.148  0.487 
 (0.220)  (0.055)*** 
Tenure   0.008  0.010 
 (0.031)  (0.004)** 
Tenure
2/100 -0.096  -0.019 
 (0.122)  (0.010)* 
Positive ∆
a 0.000  0.647 
 (0.000)  (0.156)*** 
Negative ∆
b -1.014  -0.558 
 (0.330)***  (0.081)*** 
Choice Informality  0.177   
 (0.142)   
Self Employed  0.212  0.093 
 (0.217)  (0.113) 
Part time  0.415  0.046 
 (0.208)**  (0.060) 
occupation4 0.532  -0.086 
 (0.348)  (0.046)* 
occupation5 0.145  -0.278 
 (0.240)  (0.053)*** 
occupation6 0.000  -0.222 
 (0.000)  (0.137) 
occupation7 0.960  -0.012 
 (0.310)***  (0.054) 
occupation8 0.000  0.015 
 (0.000)  (0.088) 
occupation9 0.173  -0.259 
 (0.222)  (0.043)*** 
Industry 0.304  0.241 
 (0.278)  (0.055)*** 
Construction 0.466  0.240 
 (0.420)  (0.111)** 
Services 0.301  0.149 
 (0.234)  (0.048)*** 
Other services and activities  0.745  0.146 
 (0.246)***  (0.068)** 
State -0.592  -0.084 
 (0.337)*  (0.045)* 
Privatized 0.000  0.440 
 (0.000)  (0.200)** 
Cooperative -0.140  0.019 
 (0.183)  (0.052) 
Center North  -0.654  -0.171 
 (0.277)**  (0.073)** 
South   -0.319  -0.100 
 (0.277)  (0.079) 
East   -0.480  -0.254 
 (0.254)*  (0.072)*** 
West -0.409  -0.235 
 (0.297)  (0.075)*** 
Constant 0.238  0.371   69
 (0.646)  (0.180)** 
Observations 162  1222 
R-squared 0.39  0.30 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
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Table 26. Robust regression – Males - 2003 
 Informal  Formal 
Age   -0.047  0.015 
 (0.038)  (0.009)* 
Age
2   0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)** 
Secondary   -0.111  0.098 
 (0.170)  (0.040)** 
University   0.014  0.229 
 (0.259)  (0.060)*** 
Tenure   0.105  0.009 
 (0.057)*  (0.005)* 
Tenure
2/100 -0.742  -0.014 
 (0.435)*  (0.014) 
Positive ∆
a   0.396 
   (0.117)*** 
Negative ∆
b -0.222  -0.616 
 (0.352)  (0.059)*** 
Choice Informality  0.003   
 (0.208)   
Self Employed  0.261  0.045 
 (0.202)  (0.103) 
Part time  0.228  -0.030 
 (0.295)  (0.089) 
occupation4 -0.357  -0.322 
 (0.451)  (0.088)*** 
occupation5 -0.912  -0.138 
 (0.330)***  (0.101) 
occupation6 0.186  -0.390 
 (0.472)  (0.105)*** 
occupation7 -0.531  -0.083 
 (0.282)*  (0.050)* 
occupation8 0.003  -0.073 
 (0.389)  (0.063) 
occupation9 -0.384  -0.320 
 (0.244)  (0.056)*** 
Industry 0.702  0.570 
 (0.319)**  (0.056)*** 
Construction 0.649  0.415 
 (0.255)**  (0.082)*** 
Services 0.702  0.350 
 (0.254)***  (0.056)*** 
Other services and activities  0.550  0.307 
 (0.298)*  (0.079)*** 
State -0.787  -0.019 
 (0.651)  (0.049) 
Privatized -0.386  -0.053 
 (0.334)  (0.060) 
Cooperative   -0.467 
   (0.239)* 
Center North  -0.777  -0.373 
 (0.359)**  (0.067)*** 
South   -0.903  -0.360 
 (0.357)**  (0.070)*** 
East   -0.709  -0.199 
 (0.359)*  (0.063)*** 
West -0.309  -0.327 
 (0.384)  (0.066)*** 
Constant 1.967  0.329   71
 (0.817)**  (0.185)* 
Observations 131  1312 
R-squared 0.37  0.30 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
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Table 27. Robust regression – Males - 2004 
 Informal  Formal 
Age   -0.086  0.023 
 (0.035)**  (0.009)** 
Age
2   0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)*** 
Secondary   0.230  0.166 
 (0.147)  (0.051)*** 
University   0.030  0.336 
 (0.421)  (0.073)*** 
Tenure   -0.029  0.012 
 (0.044)  (0.006)** 
Tenure
2/100 0.181  -0.015 
 (0.219)  (0.016) 
Positive ∆
a 0.000  0.161 
 (0.000)  (0.232) 
Negative ∆
b -0.801  -0.818 
 (0.588)  (0.095)*** 
Choice Informality  0.124   
 (0.173)   
Self Employed  0.395  0.006 
 (0.168)**  (0.102) 
Part time  0.389  -0.148 
 (0.252)  (0.107) 
occupation4 0.289  -0.159 
 (0.600)  (0.098) 
occupation5 -0.240  -0.223 
 (0.318)  (0.109)** 
occupation6 0.582  -0.500 
 (0.838)  (0.126)*** 
occupation7 0.013  -0.082 
 (0.239)  (0.058) 
occupation8 0.015  -0.142 
 (0.336)  (0.066)** 
occupation9 -0.516  -0.368 
 (0.208)**  (0.069)*** 
Industry 0.519  0.462 
 (0.246)**  (0.063)*** 
Construction 0.541  0.448 
 (0.227)**  (0.088)*** 
Services 0.409  0.244 
 (0.240)*  (0.062)*** 
Other services and activities  0.125  0.180 
 (0.308)  (0.090)** 
State 0.057  0.025 
 (0.408)  (0.054) 
Privatized 0.240  -0.053 
 (0.278)  (0.058) 
Cooperative 0.809  -0.221 
 (0.814)  (0.222) 
Center North  -0.678  -0.448 
 (0.385)*  (0.093)*** 
South   -0.852  -0.452 
 (0.397)**  (0.101)*** 
East   -0.508  -0.352 
 (0.374)  (0.091)*** 
West -0.502  -0.470 
 (0.399)  (0.095)*** 
Constant 2.377  0.514   73
 (0.761)***  (0.210)** 
Observations 164  1020 
R-squared 0.35  0.31 
Source:ULMS  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Default categories are: Elementary and less, highly skilled (ISCO 1 to 3), agriculture, hunting and fishing, newly 
established enterprises, Kyiv city 
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Table 28. Gender wage gap – Oaxaca decomposition not adjusted and adjusted for selection – 2003 
and 2004 
 2003 
 Formal  Informal 
  Not adjusted  Adjusted  Not adjusted  Adjusted 
Difference 0.234***  0.298***  0.195*  -2.540 
Explained
a -0.003  0.013  0.221**  0.222* 
Unexplained
b 0.236***  0.285***  -0.027  -2.762 
 2004 
 Formal  Informal 
  Not adjusted  Adjusted  Not adjusted  Adjusted 
Difference 0.238***  0.228**  0.280***  -0.436 
Explained -0.005  0.011  0.286**  0.268*** 
Unexplained 0.243***  0.218*  -0.006  -0.704 
Source:ULMS  
Notes: 
Reference (non-discriminated) group is males. 
a Endowments 
b Coefficients and interaction between coefficients and endowments 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 